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PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION
STATEMENTS
JESSICA A. ROTH*
This Article examines how prosecutors convey to various audiences
their decisions not to charge in discrete cases. Although prosecutors
regularly issue public statements about their declinations—and anecdotal
evidence suggests that declination statements are on the rise—there is an
absence of literature discussing the interests that such statements serve, the
risks that they pose, and how such statements are consistent with the
prosecutorial function. Prosecutors also operate in this space without clear
ground rules set by law, policies, or professional standards. This Article
attempts to fill that void. First, it theorizes the interests potentially advanced
by such statements—characterized as signaling, accountability, and historykeeping—and their drawbacks. Next, it describes the current landscape of
prosecutorial policies and practices on declination statements and shows
how prosecutors would benefit from a more express framework of analysis.
Finally, it offers such a framework to assist prosecutors in deciding when
and how to issue declination statements. That framework suggests that
prosecutors should only issue public declination statements when doing so
significantly furthers one or more of the interests identified herein, where the
risks posed by such statements are minimized, and where their value cannot
be realized through other available means, including other types of
statements.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 479
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Jacob Burns Center for Ethics in the Practice
of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author was an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 2002–09 and served as the Reporter for
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse (4th ed. 2016). All
views expressed are the author’s own. Thanks to Kate Levine, Max Minzner, Deborah
Pearlstein, Daniel Richman, Rebecca Roiphe, David Sklansky, and Ronald Wright for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to participants in the 2018 Criminal Justice
Ethics Schmooze and the 2018 CrimFest where this project was presented as a work in
progress. Thanks also to Michael Freyberg, Lindsay Weinstein, and Josh Ontell for excellent
research assistance.

477

478

ROTH

[Vol. 110

I. THEORIZING PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION
STATEMENTS...................................................................... 487
A. What is a Declination? .................................................... 487
B. The Interests Served by Declination Statements ............ 490
1. Signaling ................................................................... 490
a. Closure................................................................ 491
b. Respect ............................................................... 493
c. Nudges ................................................................ 493
d. Public Pedagogy about the Criminal Law .......... 496
e. Public Pedagogy about the Prosecutorial Role ... 499
2. Accountability ........................................................... 500
a. Internal Accountability to Precommitments ....... 501
b. Accountability to the Public ............................... 502
c. Accountability to Other Institutions ................... 504
d. Accountability of Other Institutions ................... 506
e. Declination Data for Context.............................. 507
3. History-Keeping ........................................................ 508
C. The Risks Posed by Declination Statements................... 513
1. Law Enforcement Risks ............................................ 513
2. Risk of Error.............................................................. 514
3. Risk of Reputational Harm........................................ 515
4. Political Risk ............................................................. 518
5. Drain on Prosecutorial Resources ............................. 519
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE REGARDING DECLINATION
STATEMENTS...................................................................... 519
A. Academic Literature ....................................................... 520
B. Professional Guidance .................................................... 521
1. Model Rules .............................................................. 521
2. Federal Guidelines .................................................... 522
3. National Standards .................................................... 527
C. Policy and Practice ......................................................... 529
1. Office Policies ........................................................... 529
2. Typology of Declination Statements in Practice ....... 531
a. Private, Sparse .................................................... 532
b. Private, Detailed ................................................. 532
c. Public, Sparse ..................................................... 533
d. Public, Detailed .................................................. 534
e. Tone .................................................................... 535
III. THE THEORY APPLIED TO PRACTICE: A SUGGESTED
FRAMEWORK FOR PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION
STATEMENTS...................................................................... 537

2020]

PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS

479

A.
B.
C.
D.

Default to Private Declination Statements ...................... 537
Sometimes Move to Public, Sparse ................................ 539
Rarely Move to Public, Detailed .................................... 541
Consider Alternatives ..................................................... 544
1. Data and Reports ....................................................... 544
2. De-Identified Case Summaries.................................. 545
3. Other Fact-Finding Institutions ................................. 545
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 549
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important aspects of the prosecutorial function is the
prosecutor’s discretion not to pursue criminal charges in discrete cases. The
exercise of negative discretion—i.e., the choice not to charge, even where the
evidence might be sufficient—is a necessary feature of our system, and a
reason why good judgment and common sense are so valuable as
prosecutorial traits. 1 Outside of a few core offenses, it is not credible to claim
that prosecutors charge every provable case brought to their attention. 2
Prosecutorial discretion mitigates “the rigors of the penal system,” 3 by
“blunting the edges” 4 of overly harsh or broad laws. In an era of expansive
criminal law and finite government resources, declinations constitute an ever

1

See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 369, 370 (2010) (“Even in a world of unlimited resources and sane criminal
codes, discretion would be essential to doing justice. Justice requires not only rules but also
fine-grained moral evaluations and distinctions.”); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1662–63
(2010) (the notion that prosecutors should rigidly apply the criminal law is “both untenable
and unattractive” and almost universally rejected in “case law and commentary”); Zachary S.
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 745 (2014) (“the
breadth and depth of substantive [criminal] law . . . presumes a regime in which executive
officials exercise discretion to moderate the rigors of statutory prohibitions, thereby creating
a law on the ground that more closely approximates popular preferences than the law on the
books.”); see also A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, r.
3-1.2(b) (“The prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and balanced
judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of
appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion not to pursue criminal charges in appropriate
circumstances.”).
2
See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600, 605 (2005).
3
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004).
4
David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 473, 506 (2016).
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more significant piece of the criminal justice picture, 5 even if the precise size
of that piece is unknown. 6
Yet, the question of how and to what extent prosecutors should be held
accountable for their exercise of negative discretion has not received
sufficient attention. Historically, prosecutors rarely accounted for their
declination decisions. 7 This was consistent with the overall lack of
prosecutorial accountability and transparency, 8 which for many years went
largely unchallenged. Unlike when they file charges, 9 prosecutors generally

5
As Dan Markel observed, “the scope of prosecutorial declinations is often
underappreciated.” Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1439 n.57 (2004).
6
See BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL
JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY–TECHNICAL REPORT, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE vi–vii
(2014); see also Eric Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
785, 795 (2012) (estimating “[a]s a rule of thumb, 25%–50% of all cases referred to
prosecutors are declined for prosecution”). Rates vary depending on the jurisdiction and the
type of case, and federal declination rates are generally higher. See Ronald Wright & Marc
Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 75 (2002). In the Vera
Institute study of the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, investigators found that
approximately 6% of felony cases, 4% of misdemeanor cases, and 11% of violations were
declined for prosecution when initially presented to prosecutors by police. Dismissal rates for
felonies and misdemeanors were considerably higher at subsequent stages of the criminal
process, up to 36% of felonies and 18% of misdemeanors, excluding cases adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal. Dismissals in cases involving domestic violence were particularly
high. See KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra.
7
See, e.g., Luna, supra note 6, at 797–801 (bemoaning the “covert” and “opaque” nature
of prosecutorial declinations, which have “hidden” the prosecutor’s decision-making process
“from the general population and those individuals subject to its strictures”); Austin Sarat &
Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, The Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of
Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 393 (2008) (“[H]istorically, [declination] decisions have
been made with little or no legal oversight.”).
8
See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 5 (2007) (observing that prosecutors’ charging decisions “are totally
discretionary and virtually unreviewable. Prosecutors make the most important of [their]
discretionary decisions behind closed doors and answer only to other prosecutors.”); Rachel
E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) (same);
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PENN.
L. REV. 959 (2009) (discussing lack of checks on prosecutorial power).
9
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (requiring an indictment or information to be a written
statement); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f) (requiring the grand jury to return the indictment to a
magistrate judge “in open court”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4) (stating that the magistrate “may
direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released
pending trial”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.10 (2018) (defining an indictment as “a written
accusation by a grand jury, filed with a superior court, charging a person, or two or more
persons jointly, with the commission of a crime . . . .”).
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are under no legal duty to make public their declinations. 10 But prosecutors
also had particular reasons to keep mum about declination decisions,
including their duty as “ministers of justice” 11 to protect the privacy interests
of those who had been under investigation, as well as witnesses and victims. 12
Other interests, too, explained the reticence to go public with such decisions,
including protecting ongoing investigations 13 and prosecutors’ prospective
ability to exercise mercy without fear of political reprisal.14 Today, for these
same reasons, it is still true that prosecutors generally do not explain
individual declination decisions, at least to a public audience. Most of the
time, when an investigation is closed without the filing of charges,
10

As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have observed, declinations may be viewed as “the
height of prosecutorial discretion . . . prosecutors do not have to state their reasons in open
court or in any other setting outside their own offices. Indeed, in some jurisdictions the
prosecutors may not have to record their reasons anywhere or explain their reasons to anyone,
even to themselves.” Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV.
125, 133 (2008); see also Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure,
15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 277, 280 (2012) (prosecutors generally are not “required to state
reasons for pursuing some [cases] while declining others.”). Indeed, even statutes conferring
rights on crime victims do not require that prosecutors disclose to victims a decision to decline
to charge. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2015) (conferring upon crime victims various rights,
including to be kept informed of any public court proceedings and to be heard at such hearings,
and to kept informed of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement). A small number
of jurisdictions require prosecutors to file a brief court document when they decline a charge
in a case initiated by police. See infra, note 198.
11
The American Bar Association describes the prosecutor as “a minister of justice,” who
accordingly has responsibilities that go beyond those of an ordinary advocate. See MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2018) [hereinafter A.B.A., Rule 3.8]. These
responsibilities include “specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural
justice [and] that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.” Id. As Justice George
Sutherland famously wrote of the prosecutor’s special role, the prosecutor is “the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
12
As then Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann told a Congressional Committee
in 1980, the Department of Justice “as an agency following the rule of law . . . [has] no
business broadcasting our ‘suspicions’ or ‘hunches’ about guilt.” MARC L. MILLER & RONALD
F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 144 (3d ed. 2007); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL at § 1-7.100 - General Need for Confidentiality
[hereinafter DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL] (“Disseminating non-public, sensitive information about
DOJ matters could violate . . . privacy rights,” “put a witness or law enforcement officer in
danger,” or “unfairly damage the reputation of a person.”).
13
See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 1-7.100 (dissemination of non-public
information also could “jeopardize an investigation or case”).
14
See Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, in PROSECUTORS AND
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 40, 48 (Maximo Langer & David Sklansky eds.,
2017).
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prosecutors do not account for that decision in a way that is accessible to the
public. 15
But occasionally prosecutors deviate from this norm, and anecdotal
evidence suggests that such occasions are increasing. 16 These gestures
toward transparency are invariably fraught. For example, then-FBI Director
James Comey’s now infamous July 2016 press conference announcing his
decision not to recommend charges against Hillary Clinton for her use of a
personal email server while serving as Secretary of State generated
considerable controversy—especially his characterization of her behavior as
“extremely careless.” 17 Similarly, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance
was widely criticized for his 2017 letter announcing his decision not to seek
charges against New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio for fundraising-related
activity, in which he nevertheless characterized the conduct as inconsistent
with the spirit of the law. 18 In 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report
regarding his investigation of coordination between Donald Trump’s 2016
Presidential Campaign and Russian officials and related matters 19
predictably satisfied no one, including those who thought Mueller was too
conservative in his legal and factual conclusions. 20 But the President’s
15

See William K. Rashbaum, No Charges, but Harsh Criticism for de Blasio’s FundRaising, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2017, at A1 (noting that “prosecutors rarely announce the
conclusion of such inquiries when no charges are filed”).
16
See Benjamin Weiser, Should Prosecutors Chastise Those They Don’t Charge?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-campa
ign-finance.html [https://perma.cc/V53W-D2XQ] (noting the “apparent trend” that
prosecutors around the country “seem to have become more willing to speak publicly about
the decision on their part not to file charges in high-profile cases”).
17
See Press Release, FBI Nat’l Press Office, Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey
on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System (July 5,
2016) [hereinafter Comey Statement] (on file with Journal and author) (characterizing Hillary
Clinton’s conduct as “extremely careless” and opining that the “security culture of the State
Department . . . was generally lacking in the kind of care for classified information found
elsewhere in the government.”).
18
See Letter from Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., Manhattan District Att’y to Risa L. Sugarman, Re:
Jan. 2016 Referral Pursuant to Election Law § 3-104(5)(B) (Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Vance
Letter] (on file with Journal and author) (noting that, while actions “do not make out a provable
violation of the Election Law’s criminal provisions,” they appeared to be “contrary to the
intent and spirit of the law” and constituted “an end run around the direct candidate
contribution limits.”).
19
See SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (March 2019) (hereinafter
MUELLER REPORT).
20
See, e.g., Bob Bauer, The Failures of the Mueller Report’s Campaign Finance Analysis,
JUST SECURITY (May 3, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63920/the-failures-of-the-mu
eller-report-campaign-finance-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/6TLW-8XGB] (criticizing Mueller
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supporters also criticized the Mueller Report, which in their opinion unfairly
and inappropriately made explicit that it did not exonerate the President, and
because it detailed the evidence and arguments to support not only
obstruction of justice but also possible violations of campaign finance laws. 21
Given the risks associated with such statements, 22 one might ask why
prosecutors ever would make them. But the risks of not publicly announcing
declinations and their rationales are daunting, too. For example, Manhattan
District Attorney Cyrus Vance was criticized when it emerged that he had
declined to prosecute President Trump’s adult children for real estate
transactions that had drawn scrutiny 23 and that he had declined to prosecute
entertainment mogul Harvey Weinstein for alleged sexual misconduct 24
without announcing those decisions publicly. To be sure, much of the
criticism in these cases (and in those discussed above—involving Clinton, de
Blasio, and Trump) was based on substantive disagreement with the
declination decisions themselves—i.e., critics believed the targets should
have been charged. But the fact that the prosecutor was perceived to be
hiding the reasons for those decisions contributed to suspicions about their

Report’s analysis of campaign finance law); Jack Goldsmith, The Mueller Report’s Weak
Statutory Interpretation Analysis, LAWFARE (May 11, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog
.com/mueller-reports-weak-statutory-interpretation-analysis [https://perma.cc/4L84-JWAJ]
(criticizing Mueller’s interpretation of obstruction of justice statutes); Josh Kovensky, In
Deciding on Trump Obstruction, Mueller Faced ‘Uncharted’ Territory, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (May 31, 2019), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/trump-obstruction-whydid-mueller-hedge [https://perma.cc/7N73-Z7PG] (quoting constitutional law professor Rick
Pildes as criticizing Mueller for “abdicating his core responsibility” when he failed to reach a
conclusion as to whether the President committed a crime).
21
See, e.g., Letter from Emmet T. Flood, Special Counsel to the Pres., to Att’y Gen.
William P. Barr 2 (April 19, 2019), [hereinafter Flood Letter] (on file with Journal and author)
(asserting that the “Special Counsel and his staff failed in their duty to act as prosecutors and
only as prosecutors” by inter alia declaring in the Report that they could not exonerate the
President, and by transmitting “a 182-page discussion of raw evidentiary material combined
with . . . inconclusive observations on the arguable legal significance of the gathered content”)
(emphasis in original).
22
See supra notes 12–14, and accompanying text.
23
See Vivian Wang & James C. McKinley Jr., Cuomo Orders Review of Decision Not to
Prosecute Weinstein in 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/0
3/19/nyregion/cy-vance-harvey-weinstein-cuomo.html [https://perma.cc/WFK2-A38B].
24
See Jesse Eisinger et al., Ivanka and Donald Trump, Jr. Were Close to Being Charged
with Felony Fraud, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/ivanka-d
onald-trump-jr-close-to-being-charged-felony-fraud [https://perma.cc/4VMM-9NUC]; Mike
McIntire, Donald Trump Settled a Real Estate Lawsuit, and a Criminal Case Was Closed,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/us/politics/donald-trumpsoho-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/78HJ-W2KC].
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legitimacy. 25 The 2019 controversy over the decision by Cook County
State’s Attorney Kimberly Foxx to drop charges against actor Jussie Smollett
for his false report of a hate crime highlights the dangers of a prosecutor
providing insufficient reasons—or insufficiently persuasive ones—to justify
the exercise of negative discretion. In that case, the mayor and the police
chief of Chicago immediately excoriated the prosecutor’s decision to drop
charges, and the Cook County Circuit Court Judge appointed a special
prosecutor to investigate the case. 26
These examples highlight the tightrope that prosecutors walk in
deciding whether and how to announce a declination decision. These
examples hail from high-profile cases, but they reveal the interests that
prosecutors are implicitly seeking to balance even in the less extraordinary
cases handled by prosecutors around the country every day. Yet there is no
literature expressly articulating those interests, how they should be balanced,
or exploring why it is consistent with the prosecutorial role for prosecutors
ever to make public their declination decisions. This Article attempts to fill
that void.
Part I begins that project by theorizing three, sometimes overlapping,
types of interests that statements about declination can serve: signaling,
accountability, and history-keeping. The first category of such interests is
described as signaling. For example, a declination statement can signal
closure or the need to pursue other avenues of relief to those most
immediately affected by the declination—including targets, victims, and
witnesses. To the larger public, declination statements can signal
prosecutors’ interpretation of the criminal law, and the reasons why certain
prosecutions, even if possible, may not be wise. Relatedly, declination
statements can convey aspects of the prosecutorial role that may not
otherwise be apparent, such as the reality that a critical part of the
prosecutor’s job is to set priorities and exercise judgment about which cases
25

For example, when first asked about the declination in the Trump case, the Manhattan
District Attorney’s Office initially said that “it could not provide information on a ‘criminal
investigation which does not result in an arrest of prosecution.’” McIntire, supra note 24.
Vance later agreed to be interviewed about the decision in an apparent effort to quell the
controversy. See Eisinger, supra note 24 (quoting Vance as explaining that “[t]his started as a
civil case . . . . It was settled as a civil case with a statement by the purchasers of luxury
properties that they weren’t victims. And, at the end of the day, I felt if we were not going to
charge criminally, we should leave it as a civil case in the posture in which it came to us.”).
26
See Julie Bosman & Sopan Deb, Jussie Smollett’s Charges Are Dropped, Angering
Mayor and Police, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/ar
ts/television/jussie-smollett-charges-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/8KLU-WQN8]; Robert
Chiarito & Julia Jacobs, Jussie Smollett Case To Be Investigated by Special Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/arts/television/jussie-smollettspecial-prosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/32F7-35MD].
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should be resolved outside the criminal justice system. Absent express
attention to declinations, the public may default to an understanding of
prosecution that consists solely of charges and convictions. To legislative
bodies and prosecutors’ law enforcement partners, declinations can send
messages about the need to fix laws and practices.
Second, declination statements serve accountability interests by forcing
prosecutors to articulate their reasoning and by providing a mechanism for
comparing like cases. So, too, declination statements can help the public
hold prosecutors accountable for their judgments. Particularly where there
is concern that certain types of people receive preferential treatment based
on their wealth, status, or relationship to the prosecutors involved (and where
is that not a concern?), declination statements may be critical to a
prosecutor’s perceived legitimacy. Such statements also can help other
institutional actors—such as legislators, governors, and law enforcement
agencies—hold prosecutors accountable for how they exercise their
discretion. Conversely, through their declinations, prosecutors also can hold
their fellow institutional actors accountable for their failure to heed prior
messages about the need for legislative reforms, increased resources, or
greater care in the conduct of investigations.
Third, declinations can serve history-keeping interests when they
provide a vehicle for relaying a narrative of past events, much as an
indictment and trial would have if charges were filed. When prosecutors
exercise their discretion not to charge, there usually is no other means
available for others to learn the information obtained by prosecutors in the
course of their investigation. Sometimes, there may be no other mechanism
for the public to learn the facts at all. In the context of complex investigations
involving public figures or particularly salient events, that represents a
significant loss to the historical record. These history-keeping interests
explain in part why many prosecutors have issued lengthy declination
statements in recent years in on-duty shootings by police officers. To be sure,
these statements further significant accountability interests by enabling
outsiders to evaluate prosecutors’ decisions not to charge as well as the
actions of police. Nevertheless, the value of such statements also lies in the
extent to which they reconstruct past events, often traumatic ones, so that the
public can understand what happened. Even if the target of such an
investigation were deceased, or a prosecutor and police chief were about to
step down, such statements would serve important public interests. Finally,
Part I concludes with a review of the risks presented by declination
statements. Those risks include potential harm to the privacy and
reputational interests of suspects, victims, and witnesses, and the
endangerment of ongoing law enforcement operations.
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Part II continues the project by highlighting how prosecutors operate in
this space with little guidance from academic scholarship or professional
policies and guidelines. Although much academic literature in recent
decades has focused on the power of prosecutors, little attention has been
paid to how prosecutors should communicate with the public about their
exercise of negative discretion. In part, this reflects a larger hole in the
literature—what Jeffrey Bellin has aptly described as the absence of a
coherent normative theory of the prosecutor’s role. 27 Without a prior
understanding of what it is we expect and want from prosecutors, it is
difficult to assess whether prosecutors are fulfilling their function well,
including appropriately conveying declinations. Prosecutors also do not find
sufficient guidance in the usual sources of professional standards. For
example, the Justice Manual (formerly the United States Attorney’s Manual),
which sets baseline policy for all Offices of the United States Attorneys,
generally counsels against public declination statements, but recognizes that
there may be circumstances in which a statement would be warranted—
without a thorough discussion of what those circumstances might be. 28 The
National District Attorney Association Standards, which provides guidance
for state prosecutors, also does not address the subject. 29 Other traditional
sources of professional standards are similarly lacking. Drawing upon
information gathered through outreach to the country’s largest prosecutorial
offices, the remainder of Part II describes how—in the absence of national
standards—prosecutors are generally making decisions about declination
statements on the ground. After analyzing the patterns that emerge, this Part
suggests a typology of prosecutors’ declination statements plotted along two
axes: one reflecting the relative publicity of a statement and the other
reflecting a statement’s level of detail.
Finally, Part III builds on the prior discussion to offer a framework to
help prosecutors navigate this difficult terrain, taking into account the extent
to which different types of declination statements fulfill the interests and
present the risks identified in Part I. It suggests that prosecutors should issue
declination statements when doing so significantly furthers one or more of
the interests identified in Part I, where the risks posed by such statements are
27
See Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020)
(discussing the absence of “concrete normative principle” of what prosecutors should do).
28
See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at §§ 1-7.100–7.400 (providing a
presumption that “non-public, sensitive information obtained in connection with work” may
not be disclosed outside of DOJ “other than as necessary to fulfill DOJ official duties” and
citing unfair “damage to the reputation of a person” as one of the reasons for the policy).
29
See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY’S ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (3d ed.
2009).
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minimized, and where their value cannot be realized through other available
means given relative institutional competencies. That framework ultimately
counsels in most circumstances against detailed public declination statements
that identify a particular individual, but encourages prosecutors to make more
extensive use of other kinds of statements about declinations—such as deidentified case summaries, aggregate reports, and narrative accounts of the
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion—that could achieve many of the same
interests, often more effectively, and pose fewer risks.
I. THEORIZING PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS
This Part begins the project of constructing a framework to guide
prosecutors in issuing declination statements by conceptualizing the interests
that such statements serve. First, it offers an operational definition of
declinations for the purposes of this Article. Second, it breaks down the
interests served by statements about declinations into three categories:
signaling, accountability, and history-keeping. Third, it reviews the risks
posed by declination statements.
A. WHAT IS A DECLINATION?

For purposes of this Article, a declination is a decision by a prosecutor
not to pursue criminal charges in a discrete case, largely as a matter of the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and judgment. 30 It does not include
30
This definition includes cases where the prosecutor ultimately determines that the
evidence is insufficient on one or more elements as well as some instances of what Roger
Fairfax characterizes as “prosecutorial nullification;” cases where the prosecutor has sufficient
evidence to convict “but declines prosecution . . . because of the belief that the application of
[the relevant] law to a particular defendant or in a particular context would be unwise or
unfair.” Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2011).
As a point of comparison, the Department of Justice defines a declination for purposes of its
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Corporate Enforcement Policy as “a case that would
have been prosecuted or criminally resolved except for the company’s voluntary disclosure,
full cooperation, remediation, and payment of disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution. If
a case would have been declined in the absence of such circumstances, it is not a declination
pursuant to this Policy.” DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-47.120 (2018); see also
Speech by Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Trevor McFadden (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-trevor
-n-mcfadden-speaks-anti [https://perma.cc/Z4B4-XY9A] (explaining that a declination for
purposes of the FCPA Enforcement Policy “does not include the many cases we routinely
decline for various reasons including insufficient evidence of corporate criminal
misconduct”). As one scholar has observed, “[t]o use the term ‘declination’ anytime a
company is under FCPA scrutiny (perhaps because of something as simple as a media report
or a business competitor’s complaint), but there is no enforcement action is like saying the
police ‘declined’ to charge a sober driver with drunk driving when passing through a field
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instances where law enforcement agents never brought a matter to the
attention of prosecutors. 31 A declination could occur before any charges are
filed, or in some circumstances after charges have been filed when the
prosecutor subsequently decides to withdraw them. 32 Declination does not
occur in cases where prosecutors pursue lesser charges than the harshest ones
supported by the facts, 33 offer non-prosecution or deferred prosecution
agreements, 34 or agree to a diversionary program in lieu of the more
traditional criminal justice process. Although there is a good argument for
including these other kinds of dispositions in that they raise many of the same
issues as outright declinations, they also are sufficiently distinct as a category
to leave out of the current project. Among other reasons, these other
dispositions are at least slightly more visible than declinations because they
often result in a court filing or are otherwise made public, often are negotiated
with defense counsel, and typically involve prosecutors maintaining leverage
over a defendant as a condition of the disposition.

sobriety checkpoint.” Mike Koehler, DOJ Defines “Declination” in Its FCPA Corporate
Enforcement Policy, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 7, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-definesdeclination-fcpa-corporate-enforcement-policy/ [https://perma.cc/68PC-WKL8].
31
See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 191–92
(2019) (discussing power of police relative to prosecutors, including by refusing to investigate
or bring case to prosecutor); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal
Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 589
(1960).
32
See, e.g., Cook County State’s Att’y, Statement on Dismissal of Charges for Jussie
Smollett (Mar. 26, 2019); Recommendation for Dismissal, People v. Dominique StraussKahn, No. 02526/2011, 2011 WL 3659989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011) (recommendation
for Dismissal filed by New York Country District Attorney Cyrus Vance, explaining motion
to dismiss sexual assault charges after indictment) [hereinafter Strauss-Kahn Dismissal].
33
See Luna, supra note 6, at 796 (noting that when a prosecutor plea-bargains, “the
prosecutor is refusing to apply the most serious crime and the toughest punishment otherwise
applicable to a given defendant[,]” a species of “prosecutorial decriminalization”).
34
As Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee have explained succinctly in the context
of corporate resolutions, an “NPA is an agreement between the prosecutor and the company,
without any direct judicial supervision, in which the prosecutor agrees not to prosecute in
return for cooperation and other concessions. In some instances, an agreement between the
prosecutor and the company may take the form of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).
A DPA is filed with a court; the prosecutor offers to defer any prosecution until a certain date
and to drop the case if the company fulfills some obligations by that date . . . . [N]either the
NPA nor the DPA entails the corporate defendant pleading guilty . . . .” Cindy R. Alexander
& Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Non-Prosecution of Corporations: Toward A Model of Cooperation
and Leniency, 96 N.C. L. REV. 859, 862 (2018).
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Also excluded from this definition are ex ante decisions about entire
categories of cases that the prosecutor will not pursue 35 or the factors that
will influence the decision whether to pursue charges in an individual case. 36
To be sure, these are related aspects of the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Moreover, the decision to decline prosecution in a discrete case
may be determined in whole or in part by reference to such ex ante policies.
35
See, e.g., District Attorney Vance to End the Prosecution of Marijuana Possession and
Smoking Cases, N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (May 15, 2018), https://www.manhatta
nda.org/district-attorney-vance-to-end-the-prosecution-of-marijuana-possession-and-smokin
g-cases/ [https://perma.cc/8ZDF-5L48]; Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn
Prosecutor Limits When He’ll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-levelmarijuana-cases.html [https://perma.cc/XK7S-G4XF] (describing announcement by then
Brooklyn District Attorney Kenneth P. Thompson that his office would no longer prosecute
most low-level marijuana cases); Jim Salter, St. Louis to End Prosecution of Low-Level
Marijuana Crimes, SEATTLE TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wo
rld/st-louis-to-end-prosecution-of-low-level-marijuana-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/2A6J-GTY
P] (describing decision by St. Louis Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner not to pursue cases
involving possession of small amounts of marijuana, and decision by Philadelphia District
Attorney Larry Krasner that his office would no longer prosecute such cases); see also
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. to All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/V
6FR-FVGX] (setting forth DOJ policy under President Barack Obama of generally not
pursuing marijuana possession and sale offenses in states where such conduct was legalized);
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen. to Selected U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19,
2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-attorneys-invest
igations-and-prosecutions-states [https://perma.cc/MF4Z-8NZ3].
36
The Department of Justice has issued such policies for a variety of white-collar
enforcement areas. See, e.g., DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-47.120 (2018)
(FCPA Division policy); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (Aug. 10,
1993) (Antitrust Division policy). Such policies are less common for other types of crime and
at the state level. As Darryl Brown has written,

The Department of Justice maintains sets of prosecution policy statements—specific to
substantive areas such as health care fraud, intellectual property crime, and corporate crime
generally—that identify appropriate grounds for charging, declination, or sentencing leniency.
The Department’s most general guidelines for criminal prosecution, found in the U.S. Attorneys’
Manual, list only traditional criteria such as deterrent effects, offender culpability, and the
seriousness of the offense, along with practical concerns such as availability of admissible proof,
cooperating witnesses, and prosecution by other jurisdictions. That document, in other words,
reads as it should according to traditional criminal law theory . . . . The common thread of
examples so far is that . . . they involve white-collar crime and federal practice. One is hardpressed to find comparable examples in the prosecution policies that guide enforcement of
traditional street-crime laws. State prosecutors tend to have few written charging policies . . . .

Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1386, 1392–
93 (2002). In some states, the legislature has enacted statutes codifying the factors that
prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to decline a case. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.411(1) (2017) (listing reasons why a prosecuting attorney “may decline to prosecute,
even though technically sufficient evidence to prosecute exists.”).
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However, while there is considerable overlap between the issues raised by
such policies and the ex post decision to charge a particular individual in a
particular case, these two different types of prosecutorial decisions are
different enough to warrant separate analysis. The intent of this limitation is
to focus on those cases where the decision not to charge was not a categorical
one; such decisions are the most revealing of prosecutors’ thought processes
and priorities because they are preceded by an assessment of the evidence
against the available charges and defenses, the norms of practice, or the
equities of a particular situation. Further, the ex ante policies excluded from
this definition of declinations herein have received some attention in
scholarly literature and in court decisions, 37 whereas the declinations that are
the focus of this Article largely have been overlooked.
B. THE INTERESTS SERVED BY DECLINATION STATEMENTS

This section elaborates on the three categories of interests that
declination statements can serve: signaling, accountability, and historykeeping. These interests sometimes overlap, and a single declination
statement may serve all three. Nevertheless, there is value in delineating and
discussing them separately, to later help build and apply a framework guiding
prosecutors’ declination statements.
1. Signaling
First, declination statements can advance signaling interests,
communicating important messages to various audiences. There are at least
five forms of signaling: (1) closure to those most immediately affected by a
declination decision; (2) respect to prosecutors’ fellow institutional actors
such as law enforcement agencies and legislators; (3) nudges about the need
for reforms; (4) educational signals to the public about the criminal law; and
(5) signals about the prosecutorial role.
37

Analysis of such ex ante policies has generally occurred in the context of agency nonenforcement rather than prosecutorial non-enforcement. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809
F.3d 134, 166–69 (2016) (discussing DAPA’s nonenforcement policy); see also Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of
Immigration Laws, the Dream Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013);
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to
Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633 (2011); Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies
Choose Whether to Enforce the Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2018); Zachary S. Price,
Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (2017). But see Feinberg v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 808 F.3d 813, 814–16 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing the
DOJ’s policy of declining certain marijuana prosecutions); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 757–59 (2014) (discussing the DOJ’s
policy of declining certain marijuana prosecutions).
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a. Closure
To begin, declination statements convey closure to the two most
important parties in potential criminal prosecutions: victims and potential
targets of prosecution. Victims benefit from knowing that a decision has
been made, even if they disagree with it. Rather than remaining in limbo,
pending the resolution of a possible criminal case, they can move on with
their lives. That closure alone is valuable, but it also can liberate victims to
pursue other avenues of redress that may be available such as civil suits, 38
legislative or executive oversight hearings, or journalistic exposure. 39
During the pendency of a criminal investigation, witnesses, including
victims, often are discouraged from pursuing such remedies out of concern
that they will compromise the criminal case. 40 Once the prosecutor has
declined to bring charges, those concerns dissipate.
38

In the vast majority of United States jurisdictions, victims and interested members of
the public cannot pursue criminal charges on their own; prosecutors, in effect, hold a
monopoly over the invocation of criminal process. A few states still allow private parties to
initiate a case, but such cases rarely proceed if prosecutors are unwilling to pursue them. See
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to
Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 867–70 (2018) (tracing the Unites States’ evolution from
a system of private law enforcement, with cases brought by victims or their kin, to a system
of public prosecution); Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law
Enforcement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 718–19 (2016) (tracing the Unites States’
evolution from a system of private law enforcement, with cases brought by victims or their
kin, to a system of public prosecution). However, crime victims may be able to pursue civil
remedies against the perpetrators of crime and third parties. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Is It
Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1568–79 (2008) (discussing rise in civil suits for
sexual assault and the advantages of such suits over criminal prosecutions).
39
For example, revelations of Alexander Acosta’s decision when he served as a United
States Attorney in Florida not to pursue charges against Jeffrey Epstein for sexual assault
prompted Congress to demand his testimony and briefings from the Department of Justice
about the case. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Acosta Defends Wealthy Sex Offender Jeffrey
Epstein’s Plea Deal, Says Epstein Would’ve Had No Jail Time if his Office Had Not
Intervened, WASH. POST (July 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/labor-sec
retary-to-hold-news-conference-to-defend-himself-amid-outcry-over-handling-of-epstein-ple
a-deal/2019/07/10/b136b9a4-a321-11e9-b7b4-95e30869bd15_story.html [https://perma.cc/4
ZH2-T7FQ]. The full scope of Epstein’s criminal conduct was the subject of extensive
investigative reporting by the Miami Herald. See Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump
Cabinet Member Gave A Serial Sex Abuser the Deal of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 28,
2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html [https://perma.cc/V
G48-GQAJ] (part of series of articles by Julie Brown collectively entitled “Perversion of
Justice” published by the Miami Herald on Nov. 28, 2018 about the Epstein case).
40
See, e.g., Clifford v. Trump, No. 18-cv-02217, 2018 WL 3435419, at *2 (C.D.C.A. Apr.
27, 2018) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 n. 27 (1970)) (describing practice of
staying civil cases during pendency of parallel criminal case); Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v.
Davis, No. 12-cv-00603, 2014 WL 12366406, at *11 (S.D. Iowa July 29, 2014) (granting

492

ROTH

[Vol. 110

Similarly, a declination statement offers closure to targets who were
aware they were under investigation. If someone had been publicly identified
during the course of the investigation, a statement also offers that target the
opportunity to resuscitate their reputation, or at least attempt to do so. For
that reason, it is not uncommon for targets to seek a declination statement. 41
Their reputations may never be fully restored, but the stigma may be lessened
by the announcement of the declination. There may also be very practical
negative consequences that flow from the investigation which can be
ameliorated only when a declination is made public. For example, a
politician will face an uphill battle running for reelection while under
investigation. 42 Private actors similarly may find that their employment
prospects will not recover until a declination is announced. Corporate
entities may find that their stock price suffers, that they are unable to contract
with government agencies, or that they are at a disadvantage in attracting
talent or business partners until the cloud of an investigation has been lifted. 43

Manhattan District Attorney’s motion to stay parallel civil proceedings brought by victim);
Capak v. Epps, No. 18-cv-4325, 2018 WL 6726553, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018)
(describing practice of staying civil cases during pendency of parallel criminal case).
41
For example, the attorney for New York Governor Andrew Cuomo praised the
announcement by then-United States Attorney Preet Bharara that his office would not be filing
charges against the Governor for interference with the Moreland Commission established to
investigate corruption, stating, “We were always confident there was no illegality here, and
we appreciate the U.S. attorney clarifying this for the public record.” Weiser, supra note 16.
Another defense attorney opined that, in cases that had received extensive publicity, “it is not
only appropriate, it is absolutely necessary [that the target] be publicly cleared” when
prosecutors decline to bring charges. Id.
42
Then-Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Joon Kim,
acknowledged this reality when he publicly announced his office’s decision not to charge
Mayor Bill de Blasio so as to not “unduly influence the upcoming campaign and mayoral
election.” Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim Statement On The Investigation Into City Hall
Fundraising, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ac
ting-us-attorney-joon-h-kim-statement-investigation-city-hall-fundraising [https://perma.cc/3
GUY-PJBZ]. The Department of Justice’s so-called “60 day” rule—a policy against
announcing charging decisions within 60 days of an election that could influence that
election—also reflects this dynamic. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
A REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 17 (June 2018).
43
See Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1287, 1288–89 (2007) (listing examples of stock declines due to investigation announcements
and discussing other corporate ramifications); U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform,
Seeking Clarity in How and When the Department of Justice Declines to Prosecute 5 (Oct.
2012) (noting the “chilling effect of pending investigations” on a “company’s financial
reporting, ability to secure credit, undertake capital initiatives, retain and recruit talent and a
host of other everyday elements necessary to business success”).
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b. Respect
Through declination statements, prosecutors also can signal respect to
the other institutional actors that are their partners in the complex undertaking
of law enforcement and governance. For example, the police and other
investigative agencies that routinely refer cases to prosecutors often will be
interested in whether the prosecutor proceeded with the filing of charges. 44
Absent a declination statement, those agencies may not otherwise find out
that a prosecutor has declined to pursue the case. Thus, providing that
information helps preserve those interagency relationships, upon which
prosecutors depend. 45 Similarly, when the legislature 46 or another agency
refers a case to the prosecutor, informing that entity of the prosecutor’s
decision may be critical to institutional comity.47
c. Nudges
When prosecutors offer the reasons for the declination—especially
when those reasons are grounded in insufficient evidence, or problems with
law enforcement agencies’ conduct of the investigation, such as an unlawful
search—the statements also can serve a pedagogical function and signal the
need for corrective action by those agencies. 48 As discussed further below
44
See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758–67 (2003) (discussing dynamic between federal
prosecutors and agents).
45
Id.; see also Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 885, 899 (2018) (noting the “close and symbiotic relationship” between prosecutors and
the police who initiate “both the criminal process and the prosecutor’s involvement” in the
majority of cases).
46
Recent examples include Congress’s referral of then-IRS Commissioner Lois Lerner to
the Department of Justice for possible prosecution for civil rights violations and other crimes
arising from the IRS’s processing of tax-exempt applications in a manner that
disproportionality impacted certain groups based on political affiliation. See Letter from Peter
J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t. of Justice, to Hon. Bob Goodlatte & Hon. John
Conyers, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2015).
47
See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 484 (noting that much of prosecutors’ influence stems
from “their air of authority and their ongoing relationships” with other institutional actors,
including legislators); see also Richman, supra note 44, at 755–94 (2003) (on prosecutors’
soft influence).
48
See also VENTURA CTY. DIST. ATT’Y OFF., LEGAL POLICIES MANUAL 158 (Rev. Nov. 2,
2018) (on file with author). See generally Adam Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Dismissals as
Teachable Moments (and Databases) for the Police, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1525 (2018)
(discussing ways in which prosecutors could use case dismissals as “teachable moments” for
police); Eric L. Nelson, The Relationship Between Individual Police Officers Work Habits and
the Stated Reasons Prosecutors Reject Their Domestic Violence Investigations, SAGE OPEN,
October–December 2013, at 8 (finding that prosecutorial feedback helped police improve their
evidence collection practices in domestic abuse cases).
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in Section I(B)(2)(d), prosecutors can hold their law enforcement partners
accountable by declining to prosecute cases on account of police misconduct
or ineptitude. However, declination statements also provide an opportunity
to educate police and other law enforcement partners, especially when they
explain how investigatory failures led to the prosecutor’s decision.
Prosecutors also can signal to legislators the limitations of existing laws
through their declination statements. For example, a prosecutor might cite
the narrow definition of bribery or the specific requirements of campaign
finance laws in explaining a decision not to file charges in cases involving
alleged public corruption. 49 Or, as frequently occurs in cases involving
alleged sexual assault, the prosecutor may cite a legal rationale, such as the
expiration of the statute of limitations, as a primary reason for declining to
file charges. 50 Such statements provide the legislature with useful
49

For example, Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s letter explaining his decision not to
charge New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio recommended several changes to the state’s
election laws to cover the conduct uncovered in his investigation. See Vance Letter, supra
note 18, at 9–10; see also Chelsea Brentzel, “Immoral but not Criminal” – Lead Prosecutor
in Bentley Probe Explains Decision Not to Bring Charges, WHNT NEWS 19 (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://whnt.com/news/politics/immoral-but-not-criminal-lead-prosecutor-in-bentley-probeexplains-decision-not-to-bring-charges/ [https://perma.cc/PU3F-GEAJ] (Alabama special
prosecutor on decision not to charge former Governor relating to his use of state funds in
connection with relationship with top aide, offering that “lawmakers need to know there are
holes in the state law that hindered the investigation. ‘Unfortunately our hands were tied, and
we could not go forward because of laws, or lack of laws.’”); Brendan Krisel, Cabbie Who
Forced Cyclist Into Path Of Truck Not Charged: Police, PATCH (Sept. 6, 2018), https://patch
.com/new-york/upper-west-side-nyc/da-declined-prosecute-cabbie-who-caused-fatal-uws-cr
ash-cops [https://perma.cc/WEA5-ZU8E] (announcement by Manhattan DA Cyrus Vance
regarding decision not to prosecute cab driver for cyclist’s death included statement that his
office had “determined that New York law does not provide criminal liability for drivers
whose illegal standing contributes to a fatality in instances where no contact is made between
the illegally standing vehicle and the victim. We would strongly support legislation to address
this gap in the law”); Beth LeBlanc, Prosecutor: No Charges for Lawmaker Who Brought Gun
to Airport, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/
michigan/2018/08/06/michigan-lawmaker-no-criminal-charges-bringing-gun-airport/913110
002/ [https://perma.cc/HCM7-J63L] (statement by Emmet County, Michigan Prosecutor that
state legislator could not be charged due to state law’s incorporation by reference of a deleted
provision of federal law, noting that “[o]ur legislature needs to address this by adding a
definition within our own statutes”).
50
See, e.g., LA Prosecutors Decline Sex Abuse Charges Against CBS CEO Les Moonves,
WGN9 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://wgntv.com/news/la-prosecutors-decline-sex-abuse-charges-a
gainst-cbs-ceo-les-moonves/ [https://perma.cc/W597-N5GG]; Sarah Mervosh, Prosecutors
Decline to Charge Kevin Spacey, Steven Seagal Due to Statute of Limitations, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/us/charges-kevin-spacey-seagal-ander
son.html [https://perma.cc/A32C-BE33]; Tilly Pearce, American Horror Story’s Dylan
McDermott Avoid Prosecution in Sexual Assault Case, METRO (Sept. 8, 2018), https://metro.
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information for deciding whether legislative reform is needed. In some
instances, prosecutors go one step further and suggest particular legislative
fixes to address the legal impediments they have identified. 51
In addition, declination statements offer the opportunity for prosecutors
to frame future actions that can be taken by other entities. For example, a
statement that primarily cites the high burden of proof in criminal cases may
signal to civil enforcement agencies and private actors that a civil suit or other
action would be worthwhile. 52 Conversely, a statement citing problems with
the credibility of key witnesses may send the opposite signal.53 Where a
legislative panel or executive actor has indicated an interest in a particular
matter, a declination statement also can forestall or shape the focus of those
entities’ investigations or oversight hearings. 54
co.uk/2018/09/08/american-horror-storys-dylan-mcdermott-avoids-prosecution-in-sexual-ass
ault-case-7925942/ [https://perma.cc/XKD7-TVM9]; Robert Tait, LA Prosecutors Decline to
Press Charges Against Bill Cosby, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/n
ews/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12087875/LA-prosecutors-decline-to-press-charges-agains
t-Bill-Cosby.html [https://perma.cc/7WJ7-GVT5].
51
In one recent case, the District Attorney for Nassau County who was assigned the
investigation of former New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman for sexual abuse cited
the narrow definitions of existing sexual assault provisions and their statutes of limitations as
reasons for her declination. She also drafted and transmitted to the state legislature a proposed
bill to enact the needed reforms she had identified. See Alan Feuer, Schneiderman Will Not
Face Criminal Charges in Abuse Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytim
es.com/2018/11/08/nyregion/eric-schneiderman-abuse-charges.html [https://perma.cc/3T9XVTRZ]; see also Vance Letter, supra note 18.
52
A number of the statements issued by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office in
recent years in police shooting cases explicitly note this distinction but do not opine on
whether the lower standard of proof could be met. See, e.g., COOK CTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, POLICE
INVOLVED DEATH DECISION MEMO 3 (Jan. 19, 2018). Similarly, Manhattan District Attorney
Vance’s letter on Mayor de Blasio emphasized that the District Attorney’s determination was
limited to whether criminal charges could be brought, given the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. He explicitly stated, “[t]his determination does not foreclose the BOE or others
from pursuing any civil or regulatory actions that they might determine might be warranted
by these facts.” See Vance Letter, supra note 18; see also MISSOURI ETHICS COMM’N, LETTER
TO ERIC GREITENS RE: MEC NO. 18-0014-I (Aug. 17, 2018) (explaining that charges against
Governor Greitens were declined in spite of the fact that the Missouri Ethics Commission
found “reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of criminal law had occurred”).
53
Statements about the credibility of witnesses may be particularly important to private
enforcement actors, such as corporate boards and professional associations, which have the
authority to discipline an individual for misconduct not rising to the level of criminality, or
not provable beyond a reasonable doubt.
54
On Congress’s authority to investigate and demand information from the Department
of Justice regarding both open and closed investigations, see MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT];
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d. Public Pedagogy about the Criminal Law
Declination statements also provide an opportunity for prosecutors to
educate the public about the content of criminal law. Through more
traditional means like charging instruments and trials, prosecutors routinely
walk the public, grand juries, and juries through the findings necessary to
convict a person of a crime. As Daniel Richman has observed, prosecutors
do not “silently preside over [the] gates” to the courthouse; “the essence of
their job is to explain how the law has been violated.” 55 This function is also
served when a prosecutor explains in a declination statement that the
evidence does not establish a necessary element of a crime, or that it supports
an affirmative defense. Through these statements, the public learns about
these aspects of the law that may be unfamiliar—and likely in language than
is more accessible than that available in court opinions, charging documents,
and even statutes themselves. 56 For example, many of the declination
statements issued in police shooting cases include a discussion of the law of
self-defense and the government’s burden in disproving such a claim. 57 The
same is true of the more procedural aspects of the law, like the burden of
MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL AND HISTORICAL SUBSTANTIALITY OF
FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVILETTI’S VIEWS AS TO THE SCOPE AND REACH OF CONGRESS’S
AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT OVERSIGHT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, reprinted in EPA’S
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 12–23 (1993).
For an example of a declination decision conveyed to Congress following a referral—and
likely aware of the strong possibility that Congressional oversight hearings would follow,
scrutinizing that decision—see Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t. of
Justice, to Hon. Bob Goodlatte & Hon. John Conyers, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2015).
55
See Richman, supra note 14.
56
As Richard Zabel, the former Deputy United States Attorney in the Southern District of
New York, once said of the value of prosecutors’ public statements, “The purpose of a quote
is to be quoted and draw attention to the case . . . . Laypeople can’t read a complaint.” Jacob
Gershman, Federal Judge Chides Bharara for ‘Tabloid’ Press Operation, WALL STREET J. L.
BLOG (Oct. 16, 2013), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/10/16/federal-judge-chides-bharara-fo
r-tabloid-press-operation/ [https://perma.cc/HYV5-R5Y3].
57
See, e.g., JACKIE LACEY, LOS ANGELES CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING
OF JUAN BARILLAS (Jan. 8, 2019); see also Federal Officials Close Review of Fatal Shooting
of Kionte Spencer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usaowdva/pr/federal-officials-close-review-fatal-shooting-kionte-spencer [https://perma.cc/G8R
Y-E7MH] (relatively long statement that discusses the facts and applicable legal standard for
the civil rights laws at issue, involving police shooting of man with BB gun). As one attorney
said in reaction to a declination statement issued by then-United States Attorney Preet Bharara
explaining the decision not to bring federal civil rights charges against an officer for a fatal
shooting, “it just spoke in terms of how high the bar is for a federal civil rights indictment,”
which “was helpful in clarifying the guidelines for prosecuting such cases.” Weiser, supra
note 16.
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the statute of limitations, which
prosecutors often cite in their rationale for declining to bring charges in
sexual assault cases. 58 The more specific the prosecutor’s explanation is for
the declination, the greater the pedagogical value of the statement.59
Declination statements also convey something that is not available in
statutes or judicial opinions—namely, the prosecutors’ interpretation of the
law, what might be called the “common law” of prosecutorial decisionmaking. 60 This is subtly distinct from the foregoing point, but it is important.
As Eric Luna observed, prosecutors do not merely enforce the law: they
“legislate criminal law, setting the penal code’s effective scope” through
their discretionary enforcement decisions. 61 Of course, this interpretive
power is exercised unofficially—in the sense that, unlike administrative
agencies, prosecutors do not have formal authority to interpret the statutes
they enforce. 62 But it is no less real. 63
58

See supra note 50.
See Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6 (2014)
(noting that prosecutors’ public statements about declinations can promote “more intensive
public engagement with criminal-justice policy”); id. at 44–45 (arguing that declination
decisions in self-defense cases in particular should include case narratives providing
information that “would usefully inform public discussion” about self-defense laws).
60
As Daniel Richman has noted, “[b]road notions of ‘prosecutorial discretion’ over what
charges they need to bring and against whom allow American prosecutors to effectively
‘define’ criminal law to be well short of that ostensibly set by statute” but “[c]onversely,
through the cases they take and the way they frame the facts, American prosecutors regularly
push the law beyond its initially assumed limits.” Richman, supra note 14, at 45–46.
61
Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VIRGINIA L. REV. 965,
992 (2019) (noting that prosecutors “largely determine the scope of modern criminal law”);
see also Erik Luna, Prosecutor King, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 48, 57 (2014).
62
See Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2115–16 (2015).
Some scholars have argued that prosecutors should have such authority. See, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 488–92
(1996).
63
For example, when James Comey announced that, in his opinion, no reasonable
prosecutor would charge Hillary Clinton for violating the statutes regarding the handling of
classified information, he was invoking this common law. See Text of F.B.I. Director’s
Remarks on Investigation into Hillary Clinton’s Email Use, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/transcript-james-comey-hillary-clinton-emails.html [https
://perma.cc/XBL6-HJ2Z] (“In looking back at our investigations into mishandling or removal
of classified information, we cannot find a case that would support brining criminal charges
on these facts.”). So too, when then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, Michael Garcia, announced that former New York Governor, Eliot Spitzer, would not
be charged for various federal crimes relating to his hiring of prostitutes, he invoked that
common law. See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, No Federal Prostitution Charges
for Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/nyregion/07sp
itzer.html [https://perma.cc/M94D-KTE6] (quoting Michael Garcia’s statement that Spitzer
59
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Criminal justice insiders—including defense attorneys who have been
around the block many times in cases involving the same potential charges
or defenses—often have access to this prosecutorial “common law.” For
example, based upon their own experience, they may know of prior instances
when a prosecutor did not think charges were worth pursuing and can draw
upon that knowledge in advising clients and negotiating with prosecutors,
including persuading them not to press charges. 64 But outsiders—including
the public at large, especially those who cannot afford to have high-priced
lawyers advise them—will not have access to that same common law. Even
lawyers who are repeat players may only be able to draw upon their own
experience if they lack the time, money, or connections necessary to pool
information with other lawyers. Opacity thus puts at a comparative
disadvantage those without access to system insiders, who may then see
worse outcomes should they get ensnared in the criminal justice system
because their lawyers lack access to these common law “precedents.” They
also are at a relative disadvantage before they ever come into contact with
the criminal justice system, when they are deciding how to conduct
themselves in light of a criminal statute, because they lack information about
how prosecutors actually apply the law (usually more narrowly than the law
is written). 65 Making a corpus of declination statements publicly available
thus serves a democratizing function, 66 leveling the playing field between
actors and competitors (including in the corporate sphere) with differing
resources. It also would provide the public with vital information about the
meaning of the criminal law in practice—a good in and of itself if we value
an informed citizenry. It also would equip the public to more effectively

would not be charged, in part, on account of longstanding policies of the Department of Justice
and of the Southern District of New York). Although Garcia’s statement did not explicitly
discuss the content of those policies, they are policies reflected in the Justice Manual against
charging individuals who are customers of prostitutes, as opposed to those engaged in the
business of promoting prostitution. Id.
64
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2131–34 (1998) (describing process by which defense counsel appeal to
prosecutors’ sense of “horizontal equity among similarly-situated persons”).
65
See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 226
(2007) (discussing how prosecutors “greatly limit the effective scope of criminal law”).
66
In the realm of corporate criminal enforcement, such a corpus exists in the form of “the
record of disclosed, detailed settlements that tell a story about who got what for doing what.”
Samuel L. Buell, Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime, 96 N. C.
L. REV. 823, 835 (2018). Some scholars like Brandon Garett have painstakingly assembled
these resources. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry, DUKE
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW & UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporateprosecution-registry/index.html [https://perma.cc/3GJD-B43E].
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demand changes in how the criminal law is interpreted if the status quo is
deemed unsatisfactory. 67
e. Public Pedagogy about the Prosecutorial Role
Finally, the public announcement of declinations surfaces the centrality
of negative discretion in the prosecutorial function. In a world of expansive
criminal law and limited resources, not every prosecutable case can or should
be charged. 68 Where prosecutors deem the evidence of a crime sufficient to
convict, they often file charges and seek convictions. But, not always.
Sometimes the exercise of negative discretion is the product of categorical
choices made ex ante based on policy priorities, but sometimes it reflects a
judgment that an individual prosecution is not worth pursuing because it is
not ultimately in the interest of justice.69 For example, a case may be
adequately prosecuted in another jurisdiction. 70 The impact on victims may
be too much to put them through. 71 Or the prosecutor may decide that the
67
See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31–34 (2012)
(exploring differences in access to information between criminal justice insiders and
outsiders); Hessick, supra note 61, at 996 (noting that because “the public rarely learns about
the cases a prosecutor does not litigate,” prosecutors’ decisions about “the scope of modern
criminal law . . . are not visible to the public”).
68
For a classic treatment of criminal law’s breadth and depth, at both the state and federal
law, see Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 979 (1995). See also William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). As Stephen
Smith has written, “[f]rom across the political spectrum, there is wide consensus that
overcriminalization is a serious problem.” Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming
Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 537 (2012).
69
For example, the state of Washington authorizes prosecutors to decline prosecution in
a variety of circumstances even where sufficient evidence exists to convict, including when
“prosecution would serve no public purpose.” WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.077 (2011).
70
See, e.g., Doug Schneider, Wisconsin DA Says He Has No Plans to File Charges
Related to Jayme Closs’ 88-Day Captivity, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.usatoda
y.com/story/news/nation/2019/01/26/jayme-closs-case-da-has-no-plan-file-more-charges/26
92969002/ [https://perma.cc/KF9N-GVDF] (describing statement by Douglas County,
Wisconsin District Attorney that he would not file additional charges against suspect already
charged in neighboring county, citing “consideration of multiple factors, including the
existence of other charges and victim-related concerns.”); see also § 13.40.077(d)–(e)
(authorizing prosecutors to decline prosecution where individual is already confined on
another charge, or another charge is pending in another jurisdiction, and conviction on the
additional charge would not yield significant additional prison time or serve any significant
purpose such as deterrence).
71
See, e.g., § 13.40.077(1)(i) (victim request may provide reason to decline prosecution,
if freely made); Fairfax, Jr., supra note 30, at 1258 (noting that “[a] prosecutor might decline
a meritorious criminal case because the potential harm to the victim resulting from the
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defendant has suffered enough through other means, or is deserving of
leniency. 72
Unless prosecutors acknowledge declinations of all types, the public is
unlikely to appreciate the significance of declinations to the prosecutorial
role and instead will view prosecutors strictly in terms of charges and
convictions. 73 Prosecutors who talk about declinations educate the public
about this crucial, often overlooked, aspect of their role. Moreover, by
initiating conversations about declinations, prosecutors communicate
something about the importance that they attach to this part of their mission.
Thus, communications about declinations, particularly those where
discretion is at its zenith because the evidence is sufficient to charge, serve a
pedagogical purpose. They also help ensure that prosecutors are held
accountable for how they conceive of and execute this critical component of
their authority.
2. Accountability
Declination statements promote the accountability of prosecutors and
other institutional actors in a variety of ways. They help prosecutors hold
themselves accountable for their own precommitments, 74 make it possible for
prosecution might outweigh the benefit to the victim and society.”); Melinda Henneberger,
Connecticut Prosecutor Won’t File Charges Against Woody Allen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25,
1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/25/nyregion/connecticut-prosecutor-won-t-file-cha
rges-against-woody-allen.html [https://perma.cc/R9KC-MH36] (suggesting that proceeding
with prosecution of Woody Allen would not be in the victim’s best interest); Schneider, supra
note 70 (discussing impact on victim as additional reason not to pursue prosecution).
72
See, e.g., Cook County State’s Att’y, supra note 32 (stating that dismissal of charges
was “a just disposition and appropriate resolution to this case,” citing “Mr. Smollett’s
volunteer service in the community and agreement to forfeit his bond” and suggesting that the
outcome would be the same for any other defendant in similar circumstances); see also
Bowers, supra note 1, at 1682 (positing that prosecution may not be warranted against a
mother who negligently kills her own child on the grounds that she “has already suffered
substantially—if not enough—from the mere fact of her child’s death”).
73
See, e.g., Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771, 776 (2017)
(noting that “prosecutors and those who observe them still often rely on crude measures of
their performance, i.e., crime rates and conviction rates . . . [which] overlook important
questions about how prosecutors exercise their discretion”).
74
As Richard Markovitz has explained, “[w]hen precommitment theorists state that ‘an
individual has made a precommitment,’ they mean that he has chosen in the present to do
something (or not to do something) in order to alter the way in which he will respond to
particular situations in the future.” Richard S. Markovitz, Precommitment Analysis and
Societal Moral Identity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1877, 1878 (2003); see also Jon Elster, Don’t Burn
Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1752–54 (2003) (describing the idea of precommitment as “self-
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external actors to hold prosecutors accountable, and also provide a means by
which prosecutors can hold accountable other institutional actors.
a. Internal Accountability to Precommitments
First, the process of constructing declination statements, even if only for
the prosecutor’s own use initially, can help prosecutors hold themselves
internally accountable to their precommitments, such as a stated commitment
to counteract implicit racial bias or to prioritize certain kinds of cases. 75 The
discipline of grounding one’s decisions in relevant facts and acceptable
reasons can help ensure that those decisions “are not made arbitrarily, or
based on speculation, suspicion, or irrelevant information.” 76 Thus, there is
intrinsic value in reason-giving. 77 A prosecutor may form an initial opinion
of the proper outcome in a case, only to find that it does not survive reasoned
analysis. In the context of judicial opinions, this is often referred to “as the
‘it won’t write’ phenomenon.” 78 Writing for potential public consumption
provides an additional level of discipline and constraint. 79 Knowing that her
reasoning may be critically evaluated by different audiences and compared
to other like cases, a prosecutor is incentivized to imagine those external
evaluations in advance. The result is likely to be an even more thorough and
thoughtfully reached decision, one less prone to the influence of biases—

binding,” a process whereby “a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure that at some
later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have performed without that prior
act”).
75
See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2017) (explaining that a “growing number of chief prosecutors
have won office by pledging a more balanced approach to criminal justice — more attentive
to racial disparities, the risk of wrongful conviction, the problem of police violence, and the
failures and terrible costs of mass incarceration.”).
76
Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 512 (2015).
77
See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1285
(2009) (“[A]n authoritative decision maker has a responsibility to herself to reach a decision
that she finds acceptable in light of her knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances.”).
78
Cohen, supra note 78, at 511; see also Richard Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do
They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (1995).
79
See Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect
Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 219–20 (2014) (“Social science
demonstrates that actors believing they will be held accountable are more likely to work
carefully and less likely to engage in error, and thus are more likely to make sound decisions
and less likely to make irrational or ill-informed ones.”).
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although not necessarily free of bias altogether. 80 Further, keeping a corpus
of declination statements can help prosecutors create and maintain
institutional memory for themselves and their successors about how they
exercised their negative discretion.
b. Accountability to the Public
Declination statements also promote prosecutors’ accountability to the
public they serve. 81 Absent a declination statement, the public can eventually
surmise that a prosecutor had declined to press charges with respect to a given
matter, but that decision would be hard to pin down and might surface too
late for there to be any meaningful accountability for it. For example,
Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s decision not to pursue sexual assault
allegations against Harvey Weinstein in 2015 82 and not to pursue fraud
allegations against Ivanka and Donald Trump Jr. in 2012 83 came to light only
years later as the result of investigative reporting. In the vast majority of
United States jurisdictions where chief District Attorneys and Attorneys
General are elected every few years, 84 this is a particularly important point. 85
80
Cohen, supra note 76, at 513. For a review of the social science literature debating the
effect of public accountability on a decision-maker’s reasoning process, see id. at 513 n.176
and sources cited therein. At the end of the day, the brain is so complex that it is difficult for
decisionmakers to control their reasoning process; indeed, the laudable effects of
accountability may be offset by others that are “perverse.” Id. (citing Robert J. MacCoun,
Psychological Constraints on Transparency in Legal and Government Decision Making, 12
SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 112 (2006)); see also Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the
Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1285 (2008). Given the contested nature
of the social science literature in this area, I am hesitant to make too strong a claim in this
regard.
81
Other scholars also have pointed to the accountability benefits of prosecutors publicly
explaining their declinations. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 30, at 1277 (noting that public
declination statements could “better inform the public (including potential voters) and,
perhaps, oversight committees”); id. at 1277 n.139 (citing sources). Fairfax was particularly
concerned about prosecutorial accounting for what he described as nullification, i.e. the refusal
to prosecute because of disagreement with the laws. See generally id.
82
See Wang & McKinley Jr., supra note 23.
83
See Eisinger et al., supra note 24; McIntire, supra note 24.
84
See Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598–99
(2014) (describing method of selection of chief prosecutors).
85
I do not want to overstate the likelihood that voters will hold prosecutors accountable
for one, or even a bundle, of declination decisions. There is a well-developed political science
literature debating “whether voters use elections as opportunities to sanction incumbents for
their prior decisions, as opposed to selecting the best available representative for an upcoming
term.” Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1269; see also Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes A
Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 353 (2002) (on low voter turnout for
prosecutorial elections in neighborhoods with high crime rates). On prosecutors being re-
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Put together with other data, including about charges filed and convictions
obtained, information about declinations can provide voters with a much
richer picture of prosecutors’ work than is currently available in most
jurisdictions. 86
However, even appointed prosecutors such as the Attorneys General of
a few states and the United States Attorneys in the ninety-seven federal
districts can be subject to indirect political pressure. Unpopular declination
decisions could be raised as a campaign issue for the elected official who
appointed the prosecutor and the elected legislators with oversight
authority. 87 Unelected prosecutors also care, to varying degrees, about their
public image 88 and popularity. 89 Some may aspire to higher political office;
elected, see, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 961 (“District Attorneys’ electoral contests are rarely
measured assessments of a prosecutor’s overall performance. At best, campaign issues boil
down to boasts about conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal. The
advantages of incumbency . . . are also huge.”); id. at 984 (discussing low voter turnout for
prosecutorial elections and voters’ reliance on “memorable but unrepresentative stories”);
Wright, supra note 84, at 600–05; Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 582–83 (2009); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide
Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1606 (2010). In the
case of Manhattan District Attorney Vance, his declination decisions in the Weinstein and
Trump cases surfaced too late for them to impact his 2013 reelection but before his 2017
election campaign, which he won. However, there are also counterexamples of prosecutors
who were defeated after widely publicized decisions in which they declined to prosecute
police. See, e.g., Ed Krayewski, Prosecutors in Chicago, Cleveland Lose Re-Election Bids
After Police Abuse Controversies, REASON (Mar. 6, 2016), https://reason.com/2016/03/16/pr
osecutors-in-chicago-cleveland-lose-re/printer/ [https://perma.cc/3HTN-6TDL].
86
See, e.g., supra note 8, at 989 (discussing the lack of information available to help voters
monitor prosecutors).
87
See Frances Robles, Prosecutors’ Softer Line Leads to Rigid Backlash, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2017, at A10 (discussing measures considered by Florida legislators to cut off
funding from Orlando prosecutor who announced she would not pursue the death penalty, and
Governor’s removal of her from pending case).
88
See Buell, supra note 66, at 838–39 (discussing various career advancement goals that
may drive federal prosecutors’ public statements about cases).
89
For that reason, even an un-elected prosecutor might defer the announcement of a
controversial declination until the eve of her departure. For example, in 2002, then-United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Mary Jo White waited until the day
before she stepped down from her post to leave for private practice to announce that she was
declining to file charges against New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli after a four-year, wellpublicized public corruption investigation. See David Kocieniewski & Tim Golden, Charges
Ruled Out as U.S. Concludes Torricelli Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2002), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2002/01/04/nyregion/charges-ruled-out-as-us-concludes-torricelli-inquiry.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/7YYC-FXPA]. Ms. White stated that her office had concluded its “exhaustive
investigation” without seeking an indictment and would refer information developed to the
Senate Ethics Committee. Id. She declined to provide further detail about her reasoning. Id. In
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others may simply have internalized their role as servants of the geographic
Either way, public expressions of
communities they represent. 90
dissatisfaction with how the prosecutor has exercised declination authority
could impact how the prosecutor exercises that discretion going forward.
c. Accountability to Other Institutions
Declination statements also enhance prosecutors’ accountability to the
law enforcement agencies with whom they work regularly. As noted in
Section I(B)(1)(b), such statements can signal prosecutors’ respect, promote
institutional comity, and provide a mechanism for conveying messages about
how law enforcement agents could do better. But they also provide a means
for agencies to check that prosecutors are in fact doing the work that the
agencies understand to be their collective project. Law enforcement agencies
can hold prosecutors accountable through a variety of methods, including
taking future cases to other offices 91 and airing their grievances with the press
or other institutions. 92 Most likely, they can use their own soft authority with
2008, then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Michael J. Garcia
waited until he was about to leave for private practice to announce that his office had decided
not to file charges against Elliot Spitzer after it had become public that Spitzer, while the
Governor of New York, had arranged for women to travel interstate for the purpose of
engaging in acts of prostitution with him. See Hakim & Rashbaum, supra note 63. The media
also can impose pressure on prosecutors. See Bibas, supra note 8, at 983–88.
90
As Sam Buell has written, even appointed prosecutors “seem to share an abiding and
reasonable belief that because their ‘client’ is the public, the client has a right to know what
the prosecutor is doing and should, in some general sense, approve of and support the
prosecutor’s work.” Buell, supra note 66, at 840.
91
See Richman, supra note 44, at 759–62.
92
See, e.g., John Bresnahan, FBI Whistleblower: Violations Occurred During Ted
Stevens’ Probe & Trial, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2008), https://www.politico.com/blogs/politiconow/2008/12/fbi-whistleblower-violations-occurred-during-ted-stevens-probe-trial-014962
[https://perma.cc/9VN7-4QZL] (describing an FBI agent’s whistleblower complaint to a
federal district court judge alleging DOJ prosecutorial misconduct prior to, and during, former
senator Ted Stevens’ trial); Jeannie Suk Gersen, Why Didn’t the Manhattan D.A. Cyrus Vance
Prosecute the Trumps or Harvey Weinstein?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www
.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-didnt-manhattan-da-cyrus-vance-prosecute-the-trump
s-or-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/3M6H-TC7A] (quoting an N.Y.P.D. statement
expressing disagreement with the Manhattan District Attorney’s insufficient evidence
determination following the Harvey Weinstein investigation); Ted Oberg, Critics Complain
Harris County DA Not Tough Enough on Crime, ABC 13 (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://abc13.com/3089352/ [https://perma.cc/8XL5-DW7X] (detailing multiple police
complaints about the Harris County District Attorney’s decisions not to prosecute); Ali
Watkins, Police Officials and Prosecutor Feud Over Case About Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2019, at A16 (describing statement on Twitter by the N.Y.P.D. Police Commissioner
decrying Manhattan District Attorney’s declination of charges against men beaten by police
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prosecutors, and the capital built through decades of working together, to
raise concerns directly with prosecutors whose decisions do not comport with
prior understandings and standards.
Similarly, declination statements facilitate prosecutorial accountability
to other government institutions. Legislative committees may have oversight
authority 93 and budgetary responsibility for the prosecutors’ office. 94
Executive branch actors may have oversight and even removal authority over
prosecutors. 95 In exercising those powers, information about prosecutors’
declination decisions can be just as useful as information about prosecutors’
decisions to charge. Similarly, prosecutors with overlapping jurisdiction can
hold each other accountable through the aggressive assertion of
jurisdiction.96 For example, a federal prosecutor who brings a case declined
by a local prosecutor may do so in part to express disapproval of the latter’s
decision, and may be less deferential in future cases that both prosecutors
have an interest in charging. 97
during chaotic arrest). As Dan Richman has observed, “iterated interaction between police and
prosecutors is not unique to liberal democracies,” but in an “open society and a media
interested in crime news, the arguments easily spill into public discourse.” Richman, supra
note 44, at 751–52.
93
See supra notes 39 and 54; see also Press Release, Sheldon Whitehouse, United States
Senator for Rhode Island, Senators Whitehouse, Hassan Press Justice Department for 2006
Purdue Pharma Prosecution Memo (Sept. 9, 2019) (detailing request by Senators for
information about case related to Purdue Pharma’s role in the opioid crisis),
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-whitehouse-hassan-press-justicedepartment-for-2006-purdue-pharma-prosecution-memo [https://perma.cc/3686-AKK9].
94
See Robles, supra note 87.
95
In some states, such as New York, the Governor has the authority to remove an elected
District Attorney from office. See ARK. CONST. art. XV, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4, para. 5;
N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(a); PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; WIS. CONST. art. 6, § 4, para. 4; see
also Eric R. Daleo, Note, The Scope and Limits of the New Jersey Governor’s Authority to
Remove the Attorney General and Others “For Cause,” 39 RUTGERS L. J. 393 (2008); Wang
& McKinley Jr., supra note 23 (discussing review by New York Attorney General’s Office of
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office ordered by the Governor); Michael Gormley, Governor
Has Little-Used Power to Remove Elected Official, NEWSDAY (May 12, 2016), https://www.
newsday.com/news/region-state/governor-has-power-to-remove-an-elected-official-but-it-s-r
arely-used-1.11793506 [https://perma.cc/3T9M-3JS4] (describing New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo’s constitutional removal power).
96
See Brown, supra note 38, at 884 (“[R]edundant federal-state authority has evolved into
a means—unusual even among federal nation-states—to second-guess and effectively trump
state prosecutors’ declination decisions.”).
97
See, e.g., Statement by United States Attorney William M. McSwain on the Shooting
of Six Philadelphia Police Officers (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/st
atement-united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphia-police [https://
perma.cc/GA6U-YXLR] (statement by United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
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d. Accountability of Other Institutions
In addition to promoting prosecutorial accountability, declination
statements can be a tool for holding law enforcement agencies and
legislatures accountable for their official actions. 98 As noted above, 99
prosecutors can use their declinations to call attention to the limitations of
existing laws and legislators’ failure to remedy them.100 So too, declination
statements can bring internal and external pressure to bear on law
enforcement agencies, to the extent that their actions (or inaction) are
perceived as undermining worthwhile prosecutions. 101 Thus, for example, if
the police are regularly engaging in unlawful searches,102 prosecutors can call
attention to those practices and how they make it difficult, or in some cases
impossible, for prosecutors to bring charges. Similarly, if police consistently
are failing to investigate cases adequately, such that prosecutors lack
sufficient evidence to proceed, calling out those failures can prompt
corrective action. 103 Likewise, if a prosecutor becomes aware of racially
Pennsylvania criticizing Philadelphia’s elected district attorney Larry Krasner, saying, “My
Office is doing all that we can. We have prosecuted 70% more violent crime cases this year
than we did last year, in response to the District Attorney’s lawlessness.”).
98
See Richman, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that prosecutors enjoy a privileged position
“to promote the accountability of other actors in the criminal justice system”).
99
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
100
See, e.g., Kylie McGivern, Prosecutors Call Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law
Unconstitutional, ABC ACTION NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news
/state/prosecutors-call-florida-s-stand-your-ground-law-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/7T
ET-WBU4] (quoting a statement of the Hillsborough County State Attorney, which described
the new version of Florida’s stand your ground law as an “ill-conceived solution . . . that
predictably created confusion and gridlock in [the] courts, which is now wasting taxpayer
resources and delaying justice for victims”); David Ovalle, Florida’s Stand Your Ground law
is Unconstitutional, Miami’s Top Prosecutor Tells High Court, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 30,
2018), https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/Florida-s-Stand-Your-Ground-law-is-u
nconstitutional-Miami-s-top-prosecutor-tells-high-court_173107373/ [https://perma.cc/76M5
-S72R] (describing the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s, and other Miami prosecutors’, negative
stance toward a recently enacted law shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution to disprove
a defendant’s claim of self-defense).
101
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, Prosecutors Say Baltimore Police
Mishandled Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/20
16/07/29/us/freddie-gray-baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/TL5Z-HWP7] (describing the
Baltimore State Attorney’s blaming of the Baltimore Police Department for failing to
adequately investigate the death of Freddie Gray, resulting in the inability to effectively
prosecute the charged officers).
102
See Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 137–41, 166.
103
See, e.g., Memorandum to Grant County Sheriff from Jim Carpenter, Grant County
District Attorney (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2852371-KOI
TZSCH-DA-Dismissal.html [https://perma.cc/355U-GZNG] (explaining decision not to
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discriminatory practices by police, she can call attention to that practice in
order to change it. 104
e. Declination Data for Context
For all of the foregoing purposes, declination statements that provide
context for the prosecutors’ decision are likely to promote accountability
better than those that merely announce a decision not to charge. Absent that
context, any assessment of the prosecutor’s action may be unreliable. In any
given case, it is possible that any reasonable prosecutor would have declined
to charge because the evidence was so lacking or the mitigating
circumstances so compelling. But no one outside the prosecutor’s office will
know that unless the prosecution explains his or her reasoning. 105 As Kate
Levine has observed regarding prosecutors’ decisions not to charge police
officers for on-duty shootings, any individual decision not to prosecute may
well be justified, but that reality will not be known to either “the public nor
other systems actors” 106 if the decision is made “behind closed doors.” 107
Thus, declination statements can provide the information necessary to hold
prosecutors meaningfully accountable, including as measured against the
prosecutors’ own previously-stated commitments. 108 When it comes to
public accountability, even a few politically salient declination statements

charge in case involving dispute among close friends, pointing to the lack of any record of
certain witness interviews and offering “While your policies may differ, [law enforcement]
investigations of relatives and close friends will be reviewed with a skeptical eye . . . . [T]he
matter should be reviewed using objective criteria before making any arrest.”).
104
See Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 166.
105
For example, the lawyer for the family of Trayvon Martin, who was killed by George
Zimmerman in Florida in 2012, called the public statement by the DOJ explaining its decision
not to file federal criminal charges “inadequate,” but noted that at least it gave ‘some insight’
into how the decision had been reached.” He stated, “My feeling is that people deserve
answers.” Weiser, supra note 16.
106
Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1482
(2016).
107
Id.
108
On the value of reason-giving in promoting government accountability more generally,
see Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1281–82; see also Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution
Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Jane Schacter, Ely and the Idea of
Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 633 (1995).
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may better promote accountability than more formal mechanisms of
review. 109
One caveat here is that this function is dependent upon the prosecutor
accurately portraying her reasons for the declination. 110 If the real reason is
not considered publicly acceptable, the prosecutor may deliberately or
unconsciously 111 set forth other reasons that are, thus depriving the public of
the information necessary to reliably assess the prosecutor’s decision. For
this reason, a critical mass of data about declinations, even if they are not all
detailed, also is important for accountability purposes. Where there is more
data, patterns emerge. 112 For example, a prosecutor who repeatedly declines
to press charges in sexual assault cases, or against police officers for on-duty
shootings, will be evaluated differently from a prosecutor who declines
rarely. But no one will know how frequently the prosecutor is declining such
cases unless enough of the relevant decisions are available to assess.
3. History-Keeping
In cases involving particularly complex investigations or high-profile
events, declinations also can serve history-keeping interests. History109
See Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power
to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 729 (2014) (discussing the accountability dividends
of “politically salient announcements by high-level officials”). In fact, to the extent that
prosecutorial elections are influenced by an incumbent’s past decisions, “[d]iscussion of
practice tends to focus on a few high-profile cases” rather than general patterns. See William
H. Simon, The Organization of Prosecutorial Discretion, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 14, at 18; see also Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 85, at
602.
110
See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2010) (noting that accountability is compromised when
public officials disclose “insincere and misleading justifications” for their decisions); see also
Fairfax, supra note 30, at 1280 (noting the ease with which prosecutors could come up with
“pretextual declination rationales” and how difficult it would be for outsiders to identify
them); Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1279.
111
The problem of inaccurate reason giving, of course, is not unique to prosecutors.
Human beings in general are often unreliable relators of their own reasons, and not because
they necessarily intend to deceive. Many scholars have discussed this problem in the context
of judicial opinion-writing. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial
Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1318–19, 1319 n.32 (1995) (“Many omissions of candor, after
all, are not conscious ploys on the part of judges, but rather the product of either less-thanthorough or genuinely self-deceptive analysis.”).
112
As Miller and Wright have written, “[A]n explanation for a single case might reveal
less than the patterns of government decision-making. Patterns can reveal both intentional and
unintentional bias, and the probable grounds for judgment. Patterns [. . .] may also be useful
in spotting ‘outlier’ cases that appear to make sense on their own terms but are harder to
explain in a larger information-rich context.” Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 184 (footnotes
omitted).
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keeping is distinct from signaling and accountability in that it focuses on the
documentation of historical facts for its own sake. The Mueller Report—to
the extent that it included hundreds of pages of findings about Russian
interference in the 2016 presidential election and communications between
Trump associates and foreign actors—fulfilled this kind of history-keeping
function. 113 As did the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) report about the 2014
shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri by police officer
Darren Wilson. 114
When a case is charged, this history-keeping function can be fulfilled
through the recitation of facts in charging documents and the presentation of
evidence and arguments at trial. Indeed, the loss of that opportunity to
publicly reconstruct past events is one of the many reasons to lament the
decline in criminal trials as guilty pleas have become the norm. 115 However,
even where a case does not proceed to trial, that narrative can be relayed in
complaints and indictments. 116 Additional details can be brought out through
113
President Trump’s lawyers ridiculed this aspect of the Mueller Report, characterizing
it as “a prosecutorial curiosity – part ‘truth commission’ report and part law school exam
paper.” Flood Letter, supra note 21.
114
See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO
THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN
WILSON (Mar. 4, 2015) (eighty-six page single-spaced report detailing evidence uncovered
during Department of Justice’s investigation, discussing applicable law, and explaining why
facts failed to meet legal requirements to charge).
115
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006
(2009), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2152 [https://perma.cc/G5CA-QTF
M] (finding that 94% of felony offenders sentenced in 2006 pleaded guilty); CSP INTERACTIVE
TOOL, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx
[https://perma.cc/883J-MEJ9] (demonstrating each state’s guilty plea rate to be above 90% in
2017); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR
2017, Table 2A (2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1081801/download [https://
perma.cc/P4VC-Y7X6] (stating that 65,309 dispositions of “guilty” were reached in federal
district courts in fiscal year 2017, with 2,123 occurring after trial; therefore, about 97% of
such guilty dispositions were reached prior to trial); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead
Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/2
0/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/Q2GP-8J8D] (For state courts, “it is a
rare state where plea bargains do not . . . account for the resolution of at least 95 percent of
the felony cases that are not dismissed . . . .”).
116
So-called “speaking” complaints or indictments that provide an extensive narrative
account of the prosecutor’s view of the facts are not without controversy. See, e.g., Buell,
supra note 66, at 825 (discussing speaking indictments or informations that have become
common in corporate prosecutions, explaining which “speak loudly, often, and at length, about
what [DOJ] is doing and why”); id. (noting that defense attorneys usually would prefer that
prosecutors keep their “court filings terse”); Jeffrey Toobin, The Showman: How U.S. Attorney
Preet Bharara Struck Fear into Wall Street and Albany, NEW YORKER (May 2, 2016), https://

510

ROTH

[Vol. 110

plea proceedings and at sentencing. 117 But when no charges are filed, the
criminal justice system generally does not provide a means for the public to
learn the facts that the prosecutor uncovered during the investigation.118
Only a small number of jurisdictions permit the issuance of investigative
grand jury reports to make public the findings of an investigation that does

www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/09/the-man-who-terrifies-wall-street [https://perma.
cc/ZY4Z-FWVL] (quoting defense attorney Henry Mazurek’s criticism of speaking
complaints filed in the Southern District of New York as “unnerving and disturbing and
fundamentally unfair”). However, prosecutors have defended such instruments as offering the
best opportunity, in a world in which most charged cases do not go to trial, to educate the
public about the events that transpired and why they constitute a crime. See, e.g., id. (quoting
former Deputy U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Richard Zabel, who
explained the value of speaking complaints, like those filed against New York Assembly
Speaker Sheldon Silver, in explaining to the public why something is a crime). In some cases,
prosecutors file lengthy speaking indictments even when there is no reasonable prospect that
the defendants will be brought to court to face the charges—as with the thirteen Russian
nationals charged by Special Counsel Robert Mueller with conspiracy to defraud the United
States for their attempt to interfere in the 2016 United States Presidential election. As some
have noted, the chief value of those indictments was to inform the public about what had
occurred, as uncovered through the Special Counsel’s investigation. Amelia ThomsonDeVeaux & Perry Bacon Jr., What If We Already Have the Mueller Report?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-we-already-ha
ve-the-mueller-report/ [https://perma.cc/YV7K-VFGB] (“Mueller has been writing a public
‘report’ over the past 15 months, through the indictments and charging documents that his
office has issued. Many of the indictments, describing what Mueller and his team have found,
are more detailed than required.”).
117
In many guilty plea proceedings, the government and the defendant make a
presentation about the factual basis for the plea. Indeed, in federal court, the judge must find
there is an adequate factual basis for the plea before accepting it. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
In corporate prosecutions, even those resolved by a deferred prosecution agreement or nonprosecution agreement prosecutors often require defendant corporations to agree to a lengthy
statement of facts. See Buell, supra note 66, at 856 (discussing evolution of “speaking
settlements” and encouraging their use so that “the facts become a lasting and indisputable
record of the case”).
118
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2173, 2216 (2014) (stating that the public’s right to information regarding individual
criminal cases “does not extend . . . to pre-arrest investigations”); Jocelyn Simonson, The
Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 262 (2019) (stating
that our criminal court system “keep[s] individual cases against defendants free of public
interference, except in the rare case of a jury trial”) (emphasis in original).
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not lead to criminal charges. 119 Unlike other executive branch agencies 120 or
legislatures, prosecutors do not have general authority to hold investigative
hearings or issue reports based upon their findings. 121 And although freedom
of information laws often provide a mechanism for the public and members
of the press to obtain, upon request, information in police and prosecutors’
files once an investigation is over, prosecutors’ memoranda reconstructing
events often are protected from disclosure under exemptions for work
product or protecting the deliberative process. 122
This constitutes a significant loss from the perspective of historykeeping. Prosecutors may have the best access to the evidence while it is
fresh. 123 They also are specialists in investigations, who are often uniquely
competent to construct a narrative of what occurred given their familiarity
119
See, e.g., Richard H. Kuh, The Grand Jury “Presentment”: Foul Blow or Fair Play?,
55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1110–14 (1955) (surveying which jurisdictions permit grand jury
reports). For examples of recent grand jury reports, see N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, REPORT OF
THE GRAND JURY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Dec. 13, 2018)
(documenting widespread fraud in the conveyance of residential real estate in New York);
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF P.A., REPORT I OF THE 40TH STATEWIDE
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY (July 27, 2018) (documenting widespread sex abuse by clergy in
Pennsylvania).
120
For example, the National Transportation Safety Bureau (NTSB) and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are authorized to issue investigative reports.
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1155 (2018) (authorizing NTSB to issue reports based upon their
investigations of accidents); 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2010) (authorizing the same for EEOC).
121
Special Counsel Robert Mueller was required under the Department of Justice
Regulations governing his appointment to issue a final report to the Attorney General
explaining his prosecution and declination decisions, but it was not clear before he issued his
report that it would include such extensive factual findings. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.09
(2020). By contrast, under the Independent Counsel Law that expired prior to Mueller’s
appointment, Independent Counsels were required to issue a report “fully and completely”
describing the Counsel’s work. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub.
L. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732. In the ordinary course, prosecutors do not have any express
authority to issue such reports. For example, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division
states that it generally “does not publicly announce investigations or investigative findings.”
When Does the Division Announce Investigations?, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
(last updated Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/when-does-division-announceinvestigations [perma.cc/CQ5T-P25H]. Further complicating the picture, to the extent that
prosecutors acquire information through use of the Grand Jury, they are legally constrained
from disclosing that information absent an indictment. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)–(e);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25(4)(a).
122
See, e.g., Worldnetdaily.Com, v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F.Supp.3d 81 (D.D.C.
2016).
123
See, e.g., MUELLER REPORT, supra note 19, at Vol. II (explaining that one rationale for
the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation, even after the Office determined that it would
not charge or even accuse a sitting President, was to collect and preserve evidence while it
was fresh and available).
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with the available facts, even as compared to other institutions that also have
subpoena power. 124 To be sure, prosecutors are imperfect and are susceptible
to the same cognitive biases as other humans, 125 so the accuracy of any report
that has not been subjected to external review or an adversarial process must
be viewed with those limitations in mind. 126 Nevertheless, when prosecutors
acting in good faith decide upon a version of events after a thorough
investigation, there is reason to think that summary is valuable and can have
a high degree of accuracy. And although this is not universally the case,
prosecutors’ reconstructions of events are often credited because of the
privileged status they enjoy in our society as truth-tellers. 127
As discussed above, one rationale for issuing detailed declination
statements is to provide accountability for the prosecutor’s decision not to
press charges. But even when there is no one left to hold accountable—for
example, if the targets of an investigation were deceased, or the prosecutor
124

See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 62, at 2133–34 (discussing some of the advantages of
prosecutors over employees at administrative agencies, such as their greater expertise in
working with informants); see also Richman, supra note 14, at 55–56 (noting that prosecutors
are uniquely positioned to “preserve what might be unstable evidence of criminal conduct”).
125
See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U.
J. L. & LIBERTY 512, 516–20 (2007); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Risk,
Maturation, and Wrongful Conviction Practice, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 648 (2017); Jessica
A. Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
737, 774–77 (2016).
126
See Flood Letter, supra note 21 (complaining that the Mueller Report was “laden with
factual information that has never been subjected to adversarial testing or independent
analysis”). By contrast, in cases that proceed to trial, a jury serves as the final check on the
accuracy of prosecutors’ allegations, and witnesses are subjected to cross-examination, which
has long been hailed as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”
See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1974). But even before trial, the system provides external checks in cases
where charges are filed: criminal complaints are sworn, subjecting the affiant to penalty of
perjury, and must be approved by a neutral magistrate judge, who can catch inconsistencies or
patently implausible assertions. Indictments must be approved by a Grand Jury. These checks
may be of questionable rigor. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261 (1995). However, their very
existence may cause prosecutors to evaluate their cases more carefully. See id. at 278
(suggesting that the screening function of the Grand Jury actually takes place largely in the
prosecutor’s office, as prosecutors decide whether to present the case to the Grand Jury).
127
See also Matthew Haag, Police Report in Killing of Black Security Guard Is Criticized
as Rushed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/securityguard-shot-by-cops-jemel-roberson.html
[https://perma.cc/4BNG-KWP4]
(describing
negative public reaction to preliminary findings exonerating police officer, announced by
Illinois State Police, three days after deadly encounter); see, e.g., Bennett Gershman, The
Prosecutor’s Duty of Silence, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1215 (2015) (observing that the
prosecutor traditionally has enjoyed the status in our culture as the “special guardian and
protector of the truth”).
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were on her way out of office—the public often will want to know the truth
about culturally and politically salient events.128 Absent an authoritative
statement from a trusted source, the public is left uncomfortably in the dark;
even worse, they are left to speculate about blame, potentially fueling
resentment and disharmony. 129 Reporting “what happened” is important for
the mechanisms of democratic accountability to function, particularly when
the targets of an investigation hold public office. But it is also important for
democratic self-understanding and reconciliation more broadly, as well as for
communities’ ability to chart the path forward.130
C. THE RISKS POSED BY DECLINATION STATEMENTS

Although declination statements can serve many interests, they also
pose risks. That is why historically they have been rare, and why the norm
of silence continues to prevail. As will be discussed in Part III, it is also why
public declination statements—to the extent they identify a particular
individual—should remain rare.
1. Law Enforcement Risks
To begin, prosecutors often will be reluctant to issue a declination
statement for law enforcement reasons. Even if the prosecutor has decided
not to charge a particular individual, the investigation may be ongoing as to
others and a declination statement as to that individual could undermine the
rest of the investigation by bringing it to public attention. 131 This reasoning
is the same as the traditional justification for grand jury secrecy. 132 In some
128

As James Comey has argued, “[i]n critical matters of national importance, a
straightforward report of what facts have been learned and how judgment has been exercised
may be the only way to advance the public interest.” James Comey, Republicans Are Wrong.
Transparency is Possible in the Mueller Investigation, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/james-comey-republicans-are-wrong-transparency-is-po
ssible-in-the-mueller-investigation/2019/03/04/f7e95f38-3ebc-11e9-a0d3-1210e58a94cf_sto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/VRK4-8HW7].
129
See Haag, supra note 127 (noting public dissatisfaction with report issued by Illinois
State Police regarding police shooting within days after the event, where findings were
characterized as “rushed” and police did not explain basis for their findings).
130
See, e.g., PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2002) (examining major truth commissions around the world);
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Phillip Tahmindjis, The Role and Value of Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, 27 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 133, 134–35 (2002).
131
See infra note 138.
132
See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1979);
Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959); United States v. Proctor &
Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958).

514

ROTH

[Vol. 110

cases, declinations could compromise methods and sources that prosecutors
prefer to keep secret—e.g., by necessarily revealing that someone close to a
target was cooperating with law enforcement. Prosecutors also might be
reluctant to announce a declination because their view of the case might
change and they are concerned about being bound by their earlier decision—
if not in law, then in perception. 133 Secrecy also maximizes deterrence of
future wrongful conduct, since uncertainty as to prosecutors’ priorities and
application of the criminal law may lead potential wrongdoers to err on the
side of caution. 134
2. Risk of Error
In addition, any information that is disclosed might be wrong or could
subsequently become refuted by further investigation. 135 Leaving false
information in the public realm disserves any of the interests advanced by
declination statements. It also is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s role as a
minister of justice 136 and undermines the prosecutor’s credibility, if the error
is later discovered. Additionally, having to correct prior statements could
undermine the prosecutor’s credibility if the prosecutor is seen as unreliable
and inconsistent. Subsequent updates may confuse the public and lead to a
self-reinforcing cycle of public statements as events change. For this reason,
133

See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 519 (noting the “persistent worries about publiclyannounced charging criteria being turned into ‘litigation weapons’”).
134
See id. at 518–19 (noting concern that “if prosecutors made their charging criteria
public, they would no longer be able to soften the edges of the law without significantly
undermining deterrence”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, at 1154–59 (2016) (discussing concerns that greater transparency
in enforcement priorities could reduce deterrence); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File
Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 246, 297 (1980) (expressing concern that, if prosecutors publicize which cases they deem
unworthy of prosecution, such publication could “reduce the legitimate deterrent and
moralizing effects of the criminal law”); supra notes 62–65 and sources cited therein
(discussing the informationally asymmetry between insiders who have access to prosecutors’
previous declination decisions based on personal experience or pooled resources, and
outsiders who do not).
135
For example, James Comey’s initial representation that the Hillary Clinton email
investigation was closed was rendered incorrect by the subsequent discovery of additional
emails on a laptop computer used by her close associate. The FBI then re-opened the
investigation, prompting Comey to so apprise Congress. See infra note 185; see also Eric
Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Chief James Comey Is in Political Crossfire Again Over Emails, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/us/politics/fbi-clinton-emails-ja
mes-comey.html [https://perma.cc/QKW7-XLPN] (describing Comey’s October 28, 2016,
letter to Congress revealing that the FBI was reviewing new emails related to the investigation
found in the course of an unrelated investigation).
136
See A.B.A., Rule 3.8, supra note 11.
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Daniel Richman observed that the prosecutor’s “safest move is always to
never say anything and let the target twist in the wind.” 137
3. Risk of Reputational Harm
Declination statements also pose significant risks to the privacy and
reputational interests of witnesses and those who were under investigation.
These concerns also animate the traditional reasons for grand jury secrecy, 138
in addition to the norm against public statements about declinations.
Grounding the decision in a specific legal requirement that cannot be
overcome, such as the statute of limitations or the prosecutor’s inability to
prove a particular element, may seem innocuous enough and serves some of
the signaling and accountability interests discussed herein. But such a
statement might imply that the evidence otherwise was sufficient to charge.
And, depending on the case, even such discrete explanations can quickly
invite further inquiries and lead to a call for further explication: precisely
what the evidence was, how it was insufficient, were specific witnesses not
credible, etc.
Once that door is open, prosecutors are on uncertain ground.
Prosecutors’ public statements regarding witness credibility and personal
beliefs about a target’s guilt or moral culpability are not permitted when
charges are filed for a number of reasons, including their potential to unfairly
prejudice a future jury. 139 When no charges are filed, the risk to a fair trial
may be absent but the risks to the target’s reputation are accentuated.
Without the public forum provided by the criminal process, a target has no
means to clear his or her name or correct mistakes of fact. That is why grand
jury reports have fallen out of favor in the federal system, 140 and the DOJ
long ago adopted a policy against naming unindicted co-conspirators. 141
137

Weiser, supra note 16 (quoting Daniel Richman).
See United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting danger of
naming unindicted co-conspirators who will have “no forum in which the vindicate
themselves”).
139
See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2020); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3.6 (2015).
Statements about prosecutors’ personal opinions also typically run afoul of rules prohibiting
lawyers from serving as both advocates and witnesses in the same case.
140
See 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (2020) and accompanying notes; see also DOJ, JUSTICE
MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 159.
141
See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-27.760 – Limitations on Identifying
Uncharged Third-Parties Publicly (citing the “privacy and reputational interests of uncharged
third parties” are reason not to identify them in plea hearings, sentencing memoranda, and
other governmental pleadings); DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-11.130 –
Limitations on Naming Persons Unindicted Co-Conspirators (“In the absence of some
138
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Even in jurisdictions that still authorize grand juries to issue investigative
reports, individuals’ names are often redacted to protect privacy and
reputational interests before the reports are released to the public—as, for
example, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2018 ordered priests’
names to be redacted from a grand jury report about sexual abuse within the
Catholic Church. 142 The value of protecting individuals’ privacy and
reputational interests also explains why those portions of prosecutors’ public
declination statements characterizing a target’s conduct as wrongful, or
opining about witness credibility, have proven so particularly
controversial. 143 As one commentator has observed, “The DOJ’s publication
of declinations with even moderately detailed factual statements creates
reputational damage.” 144 Even high-profile targets who have a more visible
significant justification, federal prosecutors generally should not identify unindicted coconspirators in conspiracy indictments”); see also United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802
(5th Cir. 1992) (noting danger of naming unindicted co-conspirators who will have “no forum
in which to vindicate themselves”). Similarly, courts also have long upheld exemption from
Freedom of Information Act Requests for information that would confirm whether an
individual had been a subject of investigation to protect their privacy. See, e.g., Massey v.
F.B.I., 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[I]ndividuals have substantial privacy interests in
information that either confirms or suggests that they have been subject to criminal
investigations or proceedings.”).
142
See In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 190 A.3d 560, 573 (Pa. 2018)
(quoting Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 395 n.7 (Pa.
2007)) (noting that the Pennsylvania Constitution places “reputational interests on the highest
plane, that is, on the same level as those pertaining to life, liberty, and property” and affording
targets named in the report the opportunity to be heard prior to publication); see also In re
Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018) (ordering names of
eleven priests permanently redacted from Grand Jury Report).
143
For example, James Comey’s characterization of Hillary Clinton’s conduct as
“extremely careless” was widely criticized. See infra note 187. So too was the public statement
by a Connecticut prosecutor who declined to prosecute Woody Allen but publicly stated that
he believed he had enough evidence to charge him. See Henneberger, supra note 71 (quoting
legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers’ statement in reaction to the prosecutor’s public statements
that, “You don’t declare the man guilty and then say you’re not going to prosecute, leaving
him to defend himself in the press . . . I can’t overemphasize how remarkable this is.”);
Weiser, supra note 16 (quoting Gillers’ statement that “a prosecutor has two choices: indict
or shut up”) (quoting law professor Rebecca Roiphe, who called prosecutors’ increasingly
common public commentary on cases without filing charges “extremely problematic”); see
also Richard Perez-Pena, Woody Allen Asks Connecticut to Discipline Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 14, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/14/nyregion/woody-allen-asks-connectic
ut-to-discipline-prosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/FR4Y-4BTQ] (quoting former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and now Second Circuit Judge,
Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, as saying “It’s always inappropriate for a prosecutor to say anything
about a case in which no charges are brought . . . [a]nd to say, ‘We think the guy is guilty’ is
outrageous.”).
144
Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1589, 1649 (2018).
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platform from which to rebut the prosecutor’s statements than the average
person still may be unable to fully mitigate the harm caused by prosecutors’
express or implied assertions of misconduct. 145
Notably, executive actors other than prosecutors can issue public
statements that shame targets as a means of providing accountability (as well
as specific and general deterrence) and are explicitly authorized to do so. For
example, the SEC has the authority under its governing statutes to issue a
letter detailing misconduct, including the identities of those specifically
involved in it, when it has decided against an enforcement action but thinks
publicity of the facts uncovered during its investigation would be in the
public interest. 146 Prosecutors can charge-bargain, defer prosecution, and
make use of diversionary programs as means of achieving what they deem to
be a just outcome. However, shaming through public statements, uncoupled
from any other official action, is not a generally accepted option in the
prosecutor’s toolkit. 147
145

As former Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan famously said following his acquittal
on state fraud charges, “Which office do I go to to get my reputation back?” Selwyn Taab,
Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1987), https://
www.nytimes.com/1987/05/26/nyregion/donovan-cleared-of-fraud-charges-by-jury-in-bronx
.html [https://perma.cc/2M4C-G5GG]. A person who has never been charged stands in a
different position than a person who is in fact indicted. Nevertheless, the lack of a public forum
in which to seek an acquittal in some ways puts the person in the former position at a
disadvantage in repairing their reputation. It is for this reason that prosecutorial standards
discourage declination statements that imply guilt. See A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, 3-1.10(c). It is also why Special Counsel Mueller decided
not to make a prosecutorial decision about whether President Trump committed obstruction
of justice. He wrote in his report that “fairness concerns” dictated such restraint, where
Department of Justice policy precluded him from filing criminal charges against a sitting
President. In that situation, Mueller concluded, it would be unfair to accuse someone of a
crime when that person would have no opportunity “for public name-clearing before an
impartial adjudicator.” MUELLER REPORT, supra note 19, at Vol. II.
146
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2015). See
generally Neal Perlman, Section 21(A) Reports: Formalizing a Functional Release Valve at
the Securities Exchange Commission, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 887 (2014) (discussing
history and purposes of Section 21(a) reports). These reports are available on the SEC’s
website, see Reports of Investigations, SEC (last updated Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.go
v/litigation/investreports.shtml [https://perma.cc/2CEY-UDM6].
147
As former Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Joon Kim
observed in an interview following his departure,“Prosecutors don’t ask and we do not answer
the questions: Is this conduct appropriate? Was this conduct ethical? Was this conduct
something we’d like to see or condone or promote in leaders? We don’t ask and we don’t
answer those questions as prosecutors. Prosecution is a blunt tool – you either prosecute
someone or you don’t. And the fact that you don’t prosecute someone doesn’t mean that
everything is hunky-dory.” Cristian Farisa, Preet Bharara’s Former Deputy on His Old Boss’s
Firing and the Michael Cohen Case, INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 29, 2018), https://nymag.com/inte
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4. Political Risk
Moreover, where the prosecutor’s reason for declining charges is based
on factors such as the allocation of resources, prior practice, or the exercise
of mercy, greater transparency may undermine prosecutors’ ability to
perform another important aspect of their role—mitigating “the rigors of the
penal system.” 148 As David Sklansky explains, prosecutors’ discretion in
charging allows the system “to fudge on its commitments” 149 by “blunting
the edges” 150 of overly harsh or broad laws. That is, prosecutors exercise
their negative discretion so that society need not bear the costs—both
economic and social—of a regime of full enforcement. Our criminal justice
system relies on prosecutors to play this mitigating function. But
traditionally, that function has been exercised in private. Too much
transparency can provide “levers for less engaged, and perhaps overly
punitive, actors to intervene in downstream decision-making.” 151 For
example, politicians could pass more punitive laws or strip funding or
authority from prosecutors whom they perceive as too lenient. Individuals
aggrieved by the prosecutor’s decision could seek to bring public pressure to
bear on prosecutors to change course. 152 Thus, the risks to prosecutors’

lligencer/2018/04/joon-kim-on-following-preet-and-the-michael-cohen-case.html [https://per
ma.cc/X5HF-QPKE] (emphasis in original).
148
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004).
149
See Bowers, supra note 1, at 1662–63 (explaining that the notion that prosecutors
should rigidly apply the criminal law “is both untenable and unattractive” and almost
universally rejected “in case law and commentary”— rather, the prosecutor’s job in part is “to
individualize justice,” through the “exercise discretion and common sense”); see also
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 506.
150
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 506.
151
See Richman, supra note 14, at 70.
152
For example, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania William
McSwain issued a public statement in 2019 fiercely criticizing progressive District Attorney
Larry Krasner and calling for accountability for Krasner’s lack of “robust enforcement” of the
criminal law. McSwain accused Krasner of “promoting “a new culture of disrespect for law
enforcement,” saying “we don’t have . . . robust enforcement by the District Attorney.
Instead . . . we have diversionary programs for gun offenses, the routine downgrading of
charges for violent crime, and entire sections of the criminal code that are being ignored . . . It
is now time for the District Attorney and his enablers to stop making excuses for criminals.”
Statement by United States Attorney William M. McSwain on the Shooting of Six
Philadelphia Police Officers (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/statemen
t-united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphia-police [https://perma.
cc/S9TS-RXWN].
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beneficial mediating role 153 must be factored into any overall assessment of
the benefits of greater public reason-giving by prosecutors.
There also is a risk that greater transparency about the reasons for
declinations may be a one-way ratchet and will increase expectations that
prosecutors will provide such disclosure in the ordinary course. Succumbing
to that pressure in cases where prosecutors are concerned about revealing
their true reasons for declination, perhaps for fear of political reprisal,
increases the risk that prosecutors will give insincere reasons—which would
undermine most interests served by declination statements. 154 On the other
hand, refusing to provide reasons in such cases may be met with frustration
and distrust, all the more so if detailed statements become more common.
5. Drain on Prosecutorial Resources
Finally, there is a risk that the more time prosecutors spend on
declination statements, the less time they will spend on their other
responsibilities, including investigating and prosecuting crime. After all,
prosecutorial resources are finite. So, it is reasonable to ask whether the
benefits of prosecutorial declinations outweigh the burdens they necessarily
impose on the day-to-day administration of prosecutorial offices and their
overall efficiency. 155
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE REGARDING DECLINATION STATEMENTS
Currently, prosecutors must navigate the benefits and risks of
declination statements without significant guidance. Academic literature has
largely overlooked this aspect of the prosecutorial role, as have most national
professional rules and standards. This Part analyzes these various sources.
First, it discusses the academic literature. Second, it turns to the model rules
153

See Barkow, supra note 134, at 1158 (noting that, given the politics of criminal justice,
greater transparency in charging criteria and priorities might cause agencies to adopt policies
that are harsher than they otherwise would); see also Sklansky, supra note 4, at 40; Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409
(2003); Wright & Miller, supra note 6.
154
See supra Part I(B). Insincerity does not entirely vitiate declination statements’ value,
however. As Glen Staszewski has observed, “it would be preferable if public citizens regularly
provided genuine reasons for their positions, but insincerity does not eliminate our ability to
evaluate the merits of their choices or the explanations that they have provided to justify them.
On the contrary, insincere explanations are more likely to be vulnerable to criticism.”
Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1289.
155
Fairfax, Jr., supra note 30, at 1277 (noting that imposing a requirement on prosecutors
that they explain all of their declinations “has the potential to be overly burdensome and
unworkable,” and that it would not be advisable to impose such a requirement as it would
“impede [prosecutors’] ability to prosecute the many cases they choose to pursue”).
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of professional conduct, federal guidelines, and national standards like those
issued by the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section and the
National Association of District Attorneys. Having exposed the lack of
guidance available to prosecutors from these sources, this Part then surveys
prosecutors’ individual policies and practices regarding declination
statements, based upon outreach to some of the nation’s largest prosecutorial
offices. Finally, this Part offers a typography of declination statements
varying along two axes. The final section of this Article, Part III, will use
the typography in providing guidance to prosecutors going forward.
A. ACADEMIC LITERATURE

Although the literature about prosecutorial discretion is vast, only a
relatively small portion of it has been devoted to prosecutors’ decisions not
to charge. And none of it has focused on how prosecutors should convey
their declination decisions to various audiences. Thus, for example, some
scholars have written about prosecutors’ duty not to decline cases involving
certain kinds of crimes, such as domestic violence or police misconduct, even
where convictions may be difficult. 156 Others have explored the legitimacy
of prosecutors’ authority to decline prosecution in the face of sufficient
evidence, 157 or challenged our criminal justice system’s entrustment of such
decisions to prosecutors as opposed to some other actor. 158 Much of the
seminal prior work on declinations has been empirical in nature, aimed at
discerning how often prosecutors decline to prosecute, in what kinds of cases,
and for what reasons. Thus, for example, for their 2008 article, The Black
Box, Marc Miller and Ron Wright examined data compiled by prosecutors in
four cities to determine what constraints, if any, appeared to guide
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion not to charge. 159 Other scholars have
analyzed federal prosecutors’ declination decisions to discern patterns and
trends. 160 All of this prior work supports one of the principal claims of this
156

See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, The Prosecutor’s Duty to ‘Imperfect’ Rape Victims, 49
TEX. TECH L. REV. 219 (2016); Rebecca Roiphe, The Duty to Charge in Police Use of
Excessive Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 503 (2017).
157
See, e.g., Fairfax, Jr., supra note 30.
158
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1362–65 (2008); Bowers, supra note 1.
159
See Miller & Wright, supra note 10. The authors determined that declinations in fact
revealed “an internal legal order at work,” reflecting internal office policies and social norms
and the “influence of substantive and procedural legal doctrines.” Id. at 130–31; see also
Bowers, supra note 1 (analyzing declination data for New York and Iowa).
160
Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980); see, e.g., Michael Edmund
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Article, namely that keeping records of prosecutors’ declination decisions is
critical to holding prosecutors accountable—precisely so that, at a minimum,
future researchers can analyze these records and report their findings. But the
prior literature does not fully explore the other interests (beyond
prosecutorial accountability) that information about declinations can
serve. 161 Nor does it consider public statements about declinations on a caseby-case basis, the particular risks associated with such statements, and when,
if ever, such statements may be warranted.
B. PROFESSIONAL GUIDANCE

1. Model Rules
The rules governing lawyers and most professional standards do not
adequately address declination statements. For example, although most
states have adopted a rule of professional conduct on trial publicity analogous
to the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6, 162 that rule addresses
statements made in the context of pending trials or other adjudicative
proceedings—not those made where no charges are filed. Similarly, Model
Rule 3.8(f), which fewer states have adopted, cautions prosecutors to refrain
from making public statements “that have a substantial likelihood of
heightening public condemnation of an accused.” 163 But by using the term
“accused,” the Rule implicitly restricts its scope to contexts in which charges
have been filed. The Rule also allows for statements “necessary to inform
the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action,” and to “serve
a legitimate law enforcement purpose,” 164 without providing guidance as to
how prosecutors might balance those interests against the mandate to protect
an accused or target from unnecessary condemnation.

O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 221 (2003).
161
Miller and Wright recognize some of the other interests that information about
declinations can serve, such as illuminating the norms or priorities of particular prosecutorial
offices and prompting changes in police practices or legal rules. See Miller & Wright, supra
note 10, at 165–66, 196. The present Article builds on Wright and Miller’s important work
and also identifies other interests served by declination statements.
162
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3.6 (2015) (providing that a lawyer who is
participating in a matter “shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter”).
163
Id. at § 3.8(f).
164
Id.
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2. Federal Guidelines
At the federal level, the Justice Manual (JM) provides instruction for
United States Attorneys on some limited issues related to declination
statements. For example, it provides that all declinations handled by the
Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Unit will be public, 165
although it does not discuss the content or form of such declinations. 166 For
other types of criminal cases, the guidance is even less clear. This absence
is particularly striking given that federal criminal prosecution is even more
discretionary than state prosecution. 167 This is especially so because there is
almost always overlapping state jurisdiction for any potential crime
investigated by federal authorities, whereas the converse is not true. 168 The
JM directs federal prosecutors to document in their files declinations for
cases referred directly by an agency 169 and provides that a United States
Attorney has the discretion to privately notify an individual previously
deemed a target than his or her target status had ended. 170 But it does not
165

See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-47.120 (“Declinations awarded under
the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy will be made public.”). The DOJ Antitrust Division
has made public a model “leniency letter.” See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MODEL LENIENCY LETTER, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/05/13/
239524.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NLA-4JDE] [hereinafter DOJ, MODEL LENIENCY LETTER].
166
The Unit’s website has links to approximately 10 declination letters written between
2016 and 2018, all of which are one to three pages long and are written to counsel for the
companies that received the declinations. Each of the letters sets forth a brief summary of the
Department’s factual findings and then explains the decision to close the case without charges,
tracking the factors set forth in the Unit’s Pilot Program (announced in April 2016) such as
the company’s efforts consistent with them, such as prompt voluntary self-disclosure, fulsome
cooperation with the Government including identification of individual wrongdoers, improved
compliance programs, and remediation. Some appear to be more like deferred or nonprosecution agreements, in that they also contain signatures by defense counsel and an
agreement to take certain additional actions.
167
See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 765 (1999).
168
See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV.
671, 682 (2014) (“[B]ecause states continue to hold primary law enforcement responsibility
within our federal system, federal prosecutors often can ignore the offense altogether, thus
leaving the decision whether to prosecute with state officials.”); Kate Stith, The Arc of the
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420, 1423
(2008) (noting that “most conduct that violates federal law also violates state law”).
169
See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-2.020.
170
See id. at § 9-11.155 (providing that a prosecutor may notify “an individual, who has
been the target of a grand jury investigation, that the individual is no longer considered to be
a target.”). The policy provides some guidance about when such notification may be
appropriate, such as when the target previously had been notified that he or she was a target;
when the relevant investigation has been discontinued without an indictment against the target;
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address when such statements should be released to the public, or other
means of communicating the declination decision more broadly 171—the
hardest questions to confront. Although the JM may be interpreted as
presumptively directing prosecutors not to publicly disclose that a particular
individual or entity was under investigation when no charges are filed (in
non-FCPA cases), it also suggests that there may be circumstances in which
an overriding interest would warrant such disclosure; but this suggestion
comes without any discussion of what those circumstances might be. 172
The most comprehensive policy on declination statements in a publicly
available document issued by the DOJ can be found in the Antitrust
Division’s “Issuance of Public Statements Upon Closing of
Investigations.” 173 Pursuant to that policy, which is not incorporated into the
JM, the Division will consider issuing a public statement about the closing
of a matter without initiating an enforcement action when the DOJ previously
had publicly confirmed the investigation 174 and when the matter was the
or when the evidence conclusively establishes that the individual’s target status had ended. Id.
The policy further provides that a United States Attorney may decline to provide such
notification for any “appropriate” reason, including, for example, a potential negative impact
on “the integrity of the investigation or the grand jury process;” and that the United States
Attorney needed not provide any explanation for declining such a request. Id. Moreover, if the
United States Attorney decides to make the notification to the former target, “the language of
the notification may be tailored to the particular case,” and “may be drafted to preclude the
target from using the notification as a ‘clean bill of health’ or testimonial.” Id. Finally, the
delivery of such a notification to a target or the target’s attorney does not preclude the United
States Attorney or Grand Jury from reinstituting the investigation without notification to the
target if the circumstances warrant such action. Id.
171
Only when charges are withdrawn after already having been filed does the Manual
address the notion of a public explanation, recommending that prosecutors explain in a court
filing the reasons for the dismissal when the case is “of considerable public interest or
importance.” DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-2.050. Then, the Justice Manual
counsels that “a written motion for leave to dismiss should be filed explaining fully the reason
for the request,” and that “the importance of the case is not to be measured simply by the
punishment prescribed for the offense.” Id.
172
See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at §§ 1-7.100–7.400 (providing a
presumption that “non-public, sensitive information obtained in connection with work” may
not be disclosed outside of DOJ “other than as necessary to fulfill DOJ official duties” and
citing unfair “damage to the reputation of a person” as one of the reasons for the policy). The
exception noted is for when the public needs to be reassured that “the appropriate law
enforcement agency is investigating a matter, or where release of information is necessary to
protect the public safety.” Id. This public safety exception is typically cited as justification for
an announcement that a suspect is at large and is considered an ongoing threat, even though
the investigation is ongoing.
173
See Issuance of Public Statements Upon Closing of Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (last updated June 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/issuance-public-statementsupon-closing-investigations [https://perma.cc/JA2M-YG8N].
174
Id.
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subject of “substantial publicity.” 175 The more publicity the matter received,
“the more likely it is that the Division will issue a statement.”176 In deciding
whether to issue a statement, the Division “will evaluate the value to the
public in receiving information regarding the reasons for non-enforcement
(including public trust in the Department’s enforcement, and the value of the
analysis for other enforcers, businesses and consumers).” 177 As for the
content of the statement, the guidance provides that “[n]o confidential or
privileged information will be disclosed, including information regarding
internal deliberations or confidential investigative techniques.” 178 Also, no
other “non-public evidence or information will be disclosed that is protected
by law” and “[n]o disparaging characterizations of individuals or
organizations will be included in the statement.” 179 The policy also provides
that any “parties to the investigation” will be given prior notice that a
statement will be released, and that the statement “will include a disclaimer”
making clear that “enforcement decisions are made on a case by case basis
and that the analysis and conclusions discussed in the statement are not
binding on the Department in future matters.” 180
The DOJ Antitrust Division’s guidance is remarkable for its relative
level of detail—but also for its limited reach. Federal criminal law
enforcement constitutes a narrow slice of the overall criminal justice picture
in the United States, 181 and criminal antitrust cases represent a tiny fraction
of that narrow slice. 182 While it is true that “antitrust analysis is complex” 183
and has potential national and international economic effects—reasons cited
in the Antitrust Division’s policy preamble for issuing statements in this
area—there are many other areas of federal criminal law that are complex, or
where considerable public benefits would accrue from transparency in
175

Id.
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
As one measure of the relative footprint of the federal criminal justice system relative
to that of the states, at the end of 2017, federal prisoners represented 12% of the total of the
U.S. prison population, whereas individuals serving state prison sentences accounted for 88%
of the total. See JENNIFER BRONSON & ANN CARSON, U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017 at 3 (Apr. 2019).
182
Compare Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated
Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts [https:
//perma.cc/W6CR-2G83] (stating that twenty-four criminal antitrust cases were filed in 2017),
with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR
2017 (2017) (stating that 53,899 criminal cases were filed in fiscal year 2017).
183
See Issuance of Public Statements Upon Closing of Investigations, supra note 173.
176
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declination decisions. Moreover, it is telling that all of the closing statements
posted on the DOJ Antitrust Division’s website pursuant to this guidance
(approximately one to four per year since 2003) appear to be issued by the
civil enforcement arm of the Antitrust Division, rather than its criminal
unit. 184
The controversy over then-FBI Director James Comey’s July 2016 press
conference regarding the closure of the Hillary Clinton investigation
confirms the absence of generally applicable guidance for federal declination
statements. As he recounted in his 2018 memoir, despite his decades of
experience as a federal prosecutor, including as United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York and Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ,
the FBI Director was uncertain as to what kind of public statement was
permissible once the investigation was over. 185 Both current and former DOJ
184

The criminal unit maintains a separate “leniency program” whereby individuals and
corporations who have violated the criminal antitrust laws can avoid prosecution if they selfreport and provide assistance in the prosecution of others. Corporations can only obtain
leniency if they are “first in the door” for a particular antitrust conspiracy. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND
MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS (Jan. 26, 2017) [hereinafter LENIENCY FAQ]. If the Department of
Justice approves a candidate for leniency pursuant to the program, it will issue a leniency letter
confirming that fact and setting forth its terms. Although the Antitrust Division has published
model leniency letters on its website, see DOJ, MODEL LENIENCY LETTER, supra note 165, it
does not make publicly available individual leniency letters since it treats the recipients as
confidential informants. See LENIENCY FAQ at 28. These kinds of leniency arrangements are
more akin to traditional cooperation agreements than declinations.
185
Comey wrote in his 2018 memoir that when the end was in sight of one of the most
high-profile and consequential investigations in modern memory, he asked his staff to research
“any policy or other limitations around making such a statement; and the wisdom and
mechanics of presenting it,” including whether the statement should be made standing next to
the Attorney General, or take the form of a written report to Congress. JAMES COMEY, A
HIGHER LOYALTY 175 (2018). That decision was rendered even more complex by the fact that
the Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, had announced that she would defer to the
recommendation of the FBI and the career prosecutors on the case, in light of concerns about
the appearance of a conflict of interest presented by Lynch’s status as a political appointee and
her private meeting on a plane with former President Bill Clinton in June 2016. See Mark
Landler et al., Loretta Lynch to Accept F.B.I. Recommendations in Clinton Email Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/us/politics/loretta-lynchhillary-clinton-email-server.html [https://perma.cc/R2UF-UCDL]. Lynch’s top deputies at the
Department of Justice similarly had announced they would defer to the FBI and the career
prosecutors’ recommendation. Comey ultimately held a press conference without any other
DOJ officials present on July 5, 2016, at which he announced that the FBI was recommending
that no charges be filed. In his prepared statement and at the press conference, Comey
characterized Secretary Clinton’s handling of her email containing classified information as
“extremely careless.” See Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Director James Comey
Recommends No Charges for Hillary Clinton on Email, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://w
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officials roundly criticized Comey’s chosen course of action—i.e., a press
conference at which he characterized Clinton’s conduct as “extremely
careless” but opined that no reasonable prosecutor would bring criminal
charges for her mishandling of classified information. 186 However, his critics
overwhelmingly cited the “norms” and “traditions” of the DOJ, rather than
explicit rules or policy statements, as the basis for their objections. 187
ww.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/politics/hillary-clinton-fbi-email-comey.html [https://perma.
cc/M3C3-UFQ3]. On July 6, 2016, Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced that she was
accepting that recommendation. See Michael D. Shear, Attorney General Accepts
Recommendation Not to Charge Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2016/07/07/us/politics/hillary-clinton-loretta-lynch.html [https://perma.cc/M523-9
TV8]. On July 7, 2016, Comey testified before the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, providing more detail about his decision. After his testimony, lawmakers
requested access to the FBI Report. See Sarah Westwood, FBI to Congress: File FOIA Request
for Clinton Email Files, WASHINGTON EXAM’R (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonexa
miner.com/fbi-to-congress-file-foia-request-for-clinton-email-files [https://perma.cc/WQ3ADSH4]. On September 2, 2016, in response to numerous FOIA requests, the FBI released its
(redacted) report on the Clinton investigation, which contained summaries of witness
interviews and emails provided by the State Department. See FBI Releases Documents in
Hillary Clinton E-Mail Investigation, FBI (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel
/press-releases/fbi-releases-documents-in-hillary-clinton-e-mail-investigation [https://perma.
cc/K2AQ-ZT68]; see also Tal Kopan & Evan Perez, FBI Releases Hillary Clinton Email
Report, CNN (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/politics/hillary-clinton-fbi-in
terview-notes/index.html [https://perma.cc/S69L-UJLK]; FBI, FBI: THE VAULT, CLINTON EMAIL INVESTIGATION (July 2016), https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton/Hillary%20R.%20Cli
nton%20Part%2001%20of%2027/view [https://perma.cc/5V5T-D7L3]. On September 23,
2016, the FBI released 200 pages of notes from its investigation. On October 28, 2016, Comey
sent a letter to congress revealing that the FBI was reviewing new emails related to the
investigation found in the course of an unrelated investigation; and on November 6, 2016 sent
another letter to lawmakers informing them that the agency had not changed its opinion. The
Department of Justice Inspector General later issued its own report about the FBI’s handling
of the Clinton email investigation. See infra notes 188–89.
186
See supra note 185.
187
See, e.g., Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., for the Att’y Gen.
(May 9, 2017) (on file with Journal and author) (memorandum by the Deputy Attorney
General initially cited by President Trump in support of his decision to fire Comey, repeatedly
citing “traditions” and “principles” of the FBI and the Department of Justice, rather than law
or policy, that the FBI director transgressed); Jamie Gorelick & Larry Thompson, James
Comey is Damaging Our Democracy, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/james-comey-is-damaging-our-democracy/2016/10/29/894d0f5e-9e49-11
e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html [https://perma.cc/KG3A-PXMM] (op-ed by two former
Deputy Attorneys General citing “long standing and well-established traditions limiting
disclosure of ongoing investigations to the public and even to Congress”). To be sure, much
of the criticism of Comey focused on two additional issues. The first was the fact that he
bypassed the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to make the announcement
himself, despite DOJ policy requiring approval of high-level Department of Justice officials
for public statements—even though the Attorney General and her deputy had announced that

2020]

PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS

527

Additionally, the DOJ Inspector General who reviewed the FBI’s handling
of the Clinton investigation concluded that Comey’s public announcement
“clearly and dramatically” departed from FBI and DOJ norms. 188 The
Inspector General recommended that, going forward, the DOJ and the FBI
consider adopting a policy about employees “discussing the conduct of
uncharged individuals in public statements,” 189 in effect acknowledging that
no such policy existed at the time.
3. National Standards
National standards issued by professional associations like the
American Bar Association are not particularly helpful in this area, either. For
example, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecutorial
Function offer an incomplete discussion of declination statements. They
provide that a “prosecutor may make a public statement explaining why
criminal charges have been declined or dismissed, but must take care not to
imply guilt or otherwise prejudice the interests of victims, witnesses or
subjects of an investigation.” 190 Missing are more detailed criteria for
deciding when a public statement is warranted, what factors to weigh when
considering issuing such a statement, and how best to avoid implying guilt
or otherwise causing prejudice. Nor do the Prosecution Function Standards
address other options available to prosecutors to accomplish these ends.
Another set of standards, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on Fair
Trial and Public Discourse, provides more fulsome guidance. The Fair Trial
Standards counsel that prosecutors and other lawyers participating in
criminal matters should not make public statements that have a substantial
likelihood of “unnecessarily heightening public condemnation”—not just of
an accused, but of any individual “publicly identified in the context of a

they would accept the recommendation of the FBI and the career prosecutors. See supra note
185. The second issue was the proximity of the announcement to the upcoming Presidential
election, which critics contended ignored a long-standing DOJ memorandum about actions
close to an election, despite the fact that the memo applied only to investigations of electionrelated crimes. See ERIC HOLDER, ATTORNEY GEN. MEMORANDUM TO ALL DEPARTMENT
EMPLOYEES, ELECTION YEAR SENSITIVITIES (Mar. 9, 2012). In any event, none of the criticism
cited any clear policy that Comey’s statements violated had he been the prosecutor in this
situation and had there been no election year sensitivities.
188
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE
2016 ELECTION 497 (June 2018).
189
Id.
190
See A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, 31.10(c).
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criminal investigation.” 191 The Fair Trial Standards then identify subject
areas that pose a particularly high risk, such as statements conveying a
prosecutor’s personal opinion about an individual’s guilt, innocence,
reputation, or character—or statements about the credibility of witnesses,
including victims. 192 However, these Standards also state that “a transparent
and open criminal justice system is of critical importance in our democracy,”
and that those involved in that system “have a duty to promote respect for
and confidence in the criminal justice system,” as well as to ensure that
criminal cases are conducted fairly. 193 To that end, they recognize that a
prosecutor may make public statements “necessary to inform the public of
the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action,” including “the existence of
an investigation in progress” and its general length and scope. 194 Thus, the
Fair Trial Standards are more detailed than those on the Prosecution Function
generally, but still do not fully address when the interests in transparency and
confidence in the criminal justice system warrant release of a declination
statement.
The National District Attorney Association (NDAA) Standards, which
are a general resource for state prosecutors, are similarly incomplete in
addressing declination statements. They provide that “[w]here permitted by
law, a prosecutor’s office should retain a record of the reasons for declining
a prosecution,” and that “[t]he prosecutor should promptly respond to
inquiries from those who are directly affected by a declination of charges.” 195
But they do not address how declination reasons should be recorded, who is
sufficiently “affected” by a declination decision to warrant a response, or
how those responses should be provided and what they should include.
However, they do counsel that victims of particularly serious crimes should
be notified, when feasible, of the rejection of a case by the prosecutor. 196
Like the DOJ’s Justice Manual, the NDAA Standards suggest that
prosecutors inform individuals who previously had been notified that they

191
A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, FAIR TRIAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE 82.1(a)(ii) (4th ed. 2013).
192
Id. at 8-2.2(a).
193
Id. at 8-1.1(b).
194
Id. at 8-2.2(b).
195
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY’S ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 4-1.7, 4-1.8
(3d. 2009).
196
See id. at 2-9.1.
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were targets of a grand jury that the investigation is over, but they do not
address questions about public release of information about declinations. 197
C. POLICY AND PRACTICE

1. Office Policies
In the absence of guidance from national organizations about
declination statements, most prosecutors’ offices are navigating this difficult
terrain on their own, with different levels of intentionality. Inquiries to some
of the largest state prosecutors’ offices in the country revealed only a handful
of policies addressing declination statements, 198 the vast majority of which
addressed only certain categories of cases (most commonly, police
shootings). 199 For example, the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General
197

Id. at Standard 3-3.8., Termination of Target Status (“If a person has previously been
notified or made aware that he or she was the target of a grand jury investigation and the
prosecutor elects not to seek an indictment or the grand jury fails to return a true bill and no
further investigation against the target is contemplated, the prosecutor should notify the person
he or she is no longer a target, unless doing so is inconsistent with the effective enforcement
of the criminal law.”).
198
In connection with this Article, we reached out to the 102 largest prosecutorial offices
in the United States, as measured by number of full-time prosecutors employed. Thirty-six
responded. Out of those thirty-six, most stated that, to the extent they had a policy, it was
unwritten and informal, although most contemplated that there were circumstances in which
public statements were appropriate. Among the factors cited were the type of case, the level
of media attention or public inquiry, or whether the accused was a police officer. Only one of
the offices stated that their policy was not to issue a statement about declinations in any kind
of case. Response from the Dep’t of the Prosecuting Attorney of Honolulu, Nov. 28, 2018,
citing HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 846-1, 846-9 (2012). Fifteen of the thirty-six offices that responded
to inquiries for this Article stated that they do not have a policy regarding, or decide on a caseby-case basis, whether to issue a declination statement at all, and what to include in it. Inquiries
to state District Attorney Organizations similarly pointed to an absence of policies on
declination statements. Of the twenty-two such organizations that responded to our inquiries,
all stated that they did not issue such policies to their members, even on a recommended basis,
and were unaware of the existence of such policies at member offices. Offices in Florida and
Massachusetts cited state laws requiring them to file documents with the clerk of court
whenever they declined to prosecute cases initiated by police. These documents, known
variously as “No Informations” or “No Prosecutions” are typically very brief and provide a
one-sentence explanation for the decision, such as the defendant’s completion of a diversion
program or insufficient evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. These
documents are available pursuant to the states’ open records laws, but inquirers must be able
to provide the docket number or defendant’s name. See FLA. STAT. § 119.021; MASS. GEN.
LAWS 4 § 7(26).
199
In response to our inquiries, twelve offices responded that it was their policy to make
a public statement about the declination of charges against a police officer, regardless of
whether they had such a policy for other types of cases. Two of those offices responded that
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has authority over all criminal justice matters in the state, but has only
promulgated a policy regarding public statements when charges are not filed
for police use of force cases. 200 It requires that the county prosecutor or the
Department of Criminal Justice “issue a public statement setting forth
findings of the investigation and findings regarding justification for use of
force” any time a case is not presented to a grand jury or the grand jury
declines to indict. 201 Similarly, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City has
adopted a policy of posting case summaries on its website explaining the
legal and factual rationale for all declinations in cases involving police use
of force. 202
In contrast, the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office in California
has issued a more broadly applicable policy about declination statements. It
provides that a written “news release” may be appropriate to announce the
rejection of charges “in a murder or other high-profile case;” 203 “the
conclusion of an investigation regarding an officer-involved shooting, in
custody, death, use of force, or other official misconduct;” 204 where charges
were rejected against “a peace office or public official for felony conduct,
moral turpitude offense, or offense related to the performance of official
duties;” 205 and where “the identity of the participants and nature of the
information is such that the case already has been covered by the news media,

they will only make a declination statement in cases involving police. In Colorado, District
Attorneys are required by state law to make a public statement for officer-involved shootings.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-114. One progressive prosecutor organization, the Association
of Prosecuting Attorneys, recommends that prosecutors provide transparency in all cases
where they decline to charge an officer in cases involving police use of force. See ASS’N OF
PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS, 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTION STANDARDS (2017), https://sfdistrict
attorney.org/sites/default/files/Document/APA%27s%2021st%20Century%20Principles%20
of%20Prosecution-Officer%20Use%20of%20Force%20Cases%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW
M2-DANZ].
200
See DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, N.J. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., UNIFORM STATEWIDE
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES FOR INVESTIGATING AND REVIEWING POLICE USE-OF-FORCE
INCIDENTS 12 (Post-Closure Public Statement).
201
Id.
202
See Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Police Use of Force Declination
Reports, https://www.stattorney.org/policy-legislative-affairs/policy/police-use-of-force-decl
ination-reports [https://perma.cc/D3YA-MVV5]. The Baltimore office did not respond to our
inquiries, but this policy is available on its website. The website notes that the Office is the
only one in Maryland that follows recommendation of the Association of Prosecuting
Attorney’s (APA) 21st Century Prosecution Standards to communicate directly with the
public when declining to charge an officer-involved shooting. Id.
203
See VENTURA CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 48, at 72–73.
204
Id.
205
Id.
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or inquiries by news media are likely.” 206 The policy instructs prosecutors to
inform investigating agents of the factual and legal reasons for rejecting
charges to keep them “current with the law as well as to assist them in
improving future investigation.” 207 However, it does not address whether
news releases should include the reasons for the declination, even in the
enumerated categories of cases in which the policy recognizes a release may
be appropriate. In King County, Washington, longtime State’s Attorney Dan
Satterberg has published an extensive policy manual; prosecutors are
instructed to notify victims and police agencies of declinations, 208 but the
policy does not specify what form those notifications should take or their
content. Nor does it address public statements such as those made at a press
conference.
2. Typology of Declination Statements in Practice
So, what do declination statements look like in practice? Not
surprisingly, they vary considerably across multiple dimensions. If
declination statements were plotted along one axis (the x-axis) by their
content, they would range from the sparsest of statements to the most detailed
(e.g. reviewing the facts and pertinent law and explaining the prosecutor’s
decision). They also could be plotted along another axis (the y-axis)
according to their intended audience, with statements composed solely for
internal consumption at one end and those intended for a public audience at
the other. The diagram below illustrates:

206

Id.
Id. at 158.
208
See KING CTY. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, FILING AND DISPOSITION
STANDARDS 7, 13 (May 2016). Upon notification, victims are provided with an opportunity to
appeal the declination decision within the prosecutor’s office. Id.
207
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a. Private, Sparse
Declination statements in the bottom left quadrant (private, sparse)
include records kept in prosecutors’ offices reflecting the decision not to
charge, but without supporting details. Such records might be as limited as
a statement that no charges were brought, full stop, along with some
identifying information about the case type, target, and any victims.
b. Private, Detailed
Moving further to the right on the x-axis, statements in the bottom right
quadrant (private, detailed) include declination statements intended primarily
for the prosecutor’s files, but that provide the basis for the decision. In some
cases, the explanation may be minimal—perhaps captured by the prosecutor
marking the applicable reasons on a checklist. 209 However, in more complex
cases, the explanation could be quite lengthy. For example, in a case
involving a fatal shooting by agents of the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S.
Capitol Police, federal prosecutors prepared a ninety-six-page memorandum
recommending against prosecution. 210
Also in this quadrant (slightly further up the y-axis) are statements
intended for limited audiences external to the prosecutor’s office, such as the
targets of an investigation, 211 victims, or referring agencies. 212 Such
statements may later become public by virtue of open records laws or
disclosure by the recipients, and may be crafted with that possibility in mind.
Examples of such statements include the DOJ’s letter to congressional

209
See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 10 (discussing practices in New Orleans District
Attorney’s office from 1988 to 1989, which required prosecutors to indicate the most
applicable reason for declining to bring charges from a list of possible reasons); see also
KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra note 6 (noting how prosecutors in New York County are
required to indicate their rationale for declining or dismissing a case from pre-determined set
of reasons).
210
The description of the memorandum’s length and ultimate recommendation comes
from a federal district court opinion, in which the court reviewed the memorandum in camera
and held that it was exempt from release under FOIA. See Worldnetdaily.Com, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp.3d 381 (D.D.C. 2016).
211
See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., No Charges for Governor After Inquiry Into
Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/us/politics/28ri
chardson.html [https://perma.cc/Y653-697U] (describing letter sent to counsel for former
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, announcing that no charges would filed following
inquiry into how a lucrative state contract was awarded to a political donor).
212
See, e.g., Memorandum to Grant County Sheriff from Jim Carpenter, Grand County
District Attorney’s Office (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28523
71-KOITZSCH-DA-Dismissal.html [https://perma.cc/JV3V-SRVJ] (explaining decision not
to charge identified individual).
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committees regarding particular practices at the IRS, 213 and Manhattan
District Attorney Vance’s letter to the New York Board of Elections
following the referral of Mayor de Blasio’s fundraising activity. 214 The
Mueller Report also falls into this category. Pursuant to the regulations
governing the Special Counsel’s appointment, the Special Counsel was
required to write a report explaining his prosecution and declination
decisions. 215 Although the regulations make clear that the report was to be
submitted initially in confidence to the Attorney General for review, 216 they
also contemplate that the report would be shared (at least in part) with
Congress and the public. 217
c. Public, Sparse
Declination statements in the top left quadrant (i.e. public, sparse) are
most commonly found in cases involving public officials or high-profile
targets, whether individuals or corporations. These types of statements
farther left on the x-axis typically disclose only that an investigation was
concluded without the filing of charges, 218 and generally are issued only
where the investigation itself already was public because of the nature of the
events under investigation or prior extensive reporting in the media. Toward
the middle of the x-axis are public statements that provide some details or
reasons to support the declination, but not lengthy ones. 219 In these
declination statements, the prosecutor may cite to such reasons as insufficient
213
See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dept. of Justice, to House
Judiciary Committee Re IRS (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Kadzik Letter] (eight-paged singlespaced letter detailing investigative findings and application of pertinent federal criminal
statutes).
214
See Vance Letter, supra note 18.
215
See 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 (2020) (providing that, at the conclusion of the Special
Counsel’s work, the Special Counsel “shall provide the Attorney General with a confidential
report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions reached”).
216
Id.
217
See 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2020).
218
See, e.g., Statement Regarding Closure of Investigation of Former Oregon Governor
John Kitzhaber and First Lady Cylvia Hayes, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., D. OR. (June 16, 2017), http
s://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/statement-regarding-closure-investigation-former-oregon-go
vernor-john-kitzhaber-and-first [https://perma.cc/5CJD-6VJK] (announcing no charges
would be filed in influence-peddling cases involving former Governor).
219
See, e.g., Marc Santora & James C. McKinley Jr., Sanford Rubenstein Will Not Face
Rape Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/nyregion/s
andy-rubenstein-will-not-face-rape-charges.html [https://perma.cc/L55S-AUVC] (quoting
statement issued by Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s office explaining the decision not to
file sexual assault charges against prominent lawyer Sanford Rubenstein, citing inter alia “the
degree of the complainant’s recollection of what occurred at the suspect’s apartment, and the
results of the toxicological testing”).
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evidence 220 or the expiration of the statute of limitations.221 Other examples
include the availability of charges in another jurisdiction 222 or the limitations
of existing law. 223
d. Public, Detailed
Finally, declination statements in the upper right quadrant (i.e. public,
detailed) are statements providing more significant detail. These are most
commonly found in cases involving police use of force. 224 This is consistent
with the policies issued by various prosecutorial offices, discussed supra, 225
which expressly encourage or require public statements whenever
prosecutors decline to press charges in such cases—including an explanation
of the facts and legal rationale. But such statements also can be found in
other contexts, especially those involving public figures. Serving as one
example is FBI Director Comey’s public statement at the (initial) conclusion
of the Hillary Clinton email investigation. In this report, Comey summarized
220

See, e.g., No Charges to be Filed Against Officers Involved in Shooting, U.S. ATT’Y’S
OFF., W.D. OKLA. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/pr/no-charges-befiled-against-officers-involved-shooting [https://perma.cc/NP8P-KA7U]; U.S. Attorney
Statement Regarding Conclusion of Investigation into Incident Involving Former Asheville
Police Officer, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., W.D.N.C. (June 29, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usaowdnc/pr/us-attorney-statement-regarding-conclusion-investigation-incident-involving-forme
r [https://perma.cc/KKT7-U36G] (stating that “the evidence does not give rise to a
prosecutable violation of the federal criminal civil rights laws”).
221
See supra note 50 and examples cited therein.
222
See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 70.
223
See supra notes 49–51 and examples cited therein.
224
See, e.g., Federal Officials Close Investigation Into Death of Alton Sterling, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST. (May 3, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigationdeath-alton-sterling [https://perma.cc/5YQ6-5CXY] (relatively long statement that discusses
the facts and applicable legal standard for the civil rights laws at issue, involving police
shooting of man with BB gun); Federal Officials Close Review of Fatal Shooting of Kionte
Spencer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/pr/federal-o
fficials-close-review-fatal-shooting-kionte-spencer [https://perma.cc/RC6D-RWBK] (same);
JACKIE LACEY, L.A. CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING OF JUAN BARILLAS
(2019); Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-decline-prosecution-d
eath-freddie-gray [https://perma.cc/WLW8-VJUP] (statement with long factual summary,
summary of applicable legal standard, and discussion of the law applied to the facts);
KIMBERLY M. FOXX, COOK CTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, POLICE INVOLVED DEATH DECISION
MEMORANDUM DECEDENT: PAUL O’NEAL (three-page, single-spaced report by Cook County,
Illinois State’s Attorney Kimberly M. Foxx explaining decision not to charge officer in onduty shooting, summarizing applicable law and facts learned during investigation). However,
one also finds examples in other contexts. See, e.g., Kadzik Letter, supra note 213; Vance
Letter, supra note 18.
225
See supra Part II(C).
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the FBI’s findings about Clinton’s actions, those of her associates, and
employees at the State Department, and the intent of those individuals in
using a private email server for public business. 226 He also explained why,
given those findings, it was his opinion that no reasonable prosecutor would
bring charges for mishandling classified material. 227 Another example is the
public statement by the Connecticut State’s Attorney Frank Marco,
explaining the decision not to press charges against Woody Allen for child
sex abuse. At a news conference, the prosecutor said that he had probable
cause to prosecute Allen, but decided that it was not in the victim’s best
interest to do so. 228 He also discussed the findings from medical evaluations
of the victim, and his own assessment of them, which led him to believe that
his office had enough evidence to take the case to trial. 229
Such detailed statements also are more common in cases where a
prosecutor has decided to withdraw charges after they have been filed. 230 For
example, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance filed a twenty-five-page
document with the court when it sought to dismiss the charges against former
World Bank Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, explaining the Office’s
reasons for doubting the complaining witness’s credibility and detailing the
prosecutor’s ethical duty to proceed with a criminal prosecution only when
personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt and that the evidence would be
sufficient to convict. 231 The DOJ’s declination letters in FCPA cases also
arguably fall into this category, because they often include lengthy fact
sections describing the corporate conduct that violated that FCPA statute
(such as the payment of bribes to foreign leaders) and the reasons for the
declination (such as prompt self-reporting, cooperation with investigating
authorities, or remedial action). However, these statements generally read
more like negotiated settlements in which defense counsel played a
significant role than the typical declination statement issued in the context of
an individual target. 232
e. Tone
One final aspect of declination statements merits discussion: their tone.
Detailed statements (those falling on the right half of the diagram) can be
226

See Comey Statement, supra note 17.
Id.
228
See Henneberger, supra note 71.
229
Id.
230
See, e.g., Statement by Cook County, Illinois Prosecutor regarding Jussie Smollett,
supra note 32; Strauss-Kahn Dismissal, supra note 32.
231
See Strauss-Kahn Dismissal, supra note 32, at 4.
232
See supra note 166 (describing FCPA letters posted on DOJ website).
227
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inculpatory—i.e. they characterize the facts in a way that implies wrongdoing
on the part of the target. Examples of inculpatory statements include those
by FBI Director Comey about Hillary Clinton and the State Department’s
conduct, Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s statements about Mayor de
Blasio’s fundraising activity, and Connecticut State’s Attorney Marco’s
statement about Woody Allen. 233 Such inculpatory statements are rare and
seem to be most common in cases involving public officials and allegations
of official misconduct where prosecutors may be concerned that the
declination will otherwise send suboptimal signals (e.g. that certain conduct
is acceptable) and will not sufficiently hold wrongdoers (if not lawbreakers)
accountable. 234 However, declination statements can also be inculpatory as
to victims or witnesses. For example, Manhattan District Attorney Vance
asserted in his motion to dismiss the sexual assault charges against
Dominique Strauss-Kahn that “the complainant’s credibility cannot
withstand the most basic evaluation,” 235 which was accompanied by
extensive factual details to support that characterization.236 These derogatory
statements about witnesses or victims, which are rare, seem to arise in cases
involving high-profile targets where prosecutors anticipate accusations of
preferential treatment.
Each type of declination statement discussed above furthers some of the
interests identified in Part I and also poses some risk. The following section
discusses how prosecutors can maximize such benefits and minimize the
risks in various contexts.

233
See, Comey Statement, supra note 17 (characterizing Hillary Clinton’s conduct as
“extremely careless” and opining that the “security culture of the State Department . . . was
generally lacking in the kind of care for classified information found elsewhere in the
government”); Vance Letter, supra note 18 (noting that, while actions “do not make out a
provable violation of the Election Law’s criminal provisions,” they appeared to be “contrary
to the intent and spirit of the law” and constituted “an end run around the direct candidate
contribution limits”).
234
See, e.g., Statement of the United States Attorney, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., S.D. IND. (Oct.
22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdin/pr/statement-united-states-attorney [https://per
ma.cc/C6D7-SY3Q] (announcing decision not to charge former elected Marion County
prosecutor for abuse of his position, but calling the conduct “unacceptable” and announcing
that the matter would be referred for investigation to the relevant ethics entities); McKinley,
Jr., supra note 211 (describing letter sent to counsel for former New Mexico Governor Bill
Richardson, announcing that no charges would filed but stating that “pressure from the
governor’s office resulted in corruption of the procurement process” and that the letter “should
not be interpreted as exoneration of any party’s conduct in that matter”); Kadzik Letter, supra
note 213, at 1, 8 (describing conduct discovered as “ineffective management” and “poor
judgment” which was “disquieting” but not a crime); Henneberger, supra note 71.
235
Strauss-Kahn Dismissal, supra note 32, at 2.
236
Id.
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III. THE THEORY APPLIED TO PRACTICE: A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR
PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS
Part III builds on the preceding sections to offer a framework to help
prosecutors decide when and how to issue declination statements. The
guiding principle of the framework is that prosecutors should issue
declination statements when they significantly further one or more of the
interests identified in Part I, where the risks posed by such statements are
minimized, and where their value cannot be realized through other available
means taking into account relative institutional competencies.
A. DEFAULT TO PRIVATE DECLINATION STATEMENTS

The framework assumes that prosecutors at a minimum will keep some
record of declinations internally, such that the default declination statement
will fall in the bottom left quadrant of the diagram (private, sparse). There
is little to no risk associated with keeping private, sparse declination records
other than minor administrative burdens. And that burden is outweighed by
the interests that such records can serve. On an individual level, such records
enable prosecutors to respond to inquiries (as appropriate) from targets,
victims, and referring agencies, thus furthering significant signaling interests
(e.g., closure and respect). Records are particularly important if such
inquiries arise long after the reviewing prosecutor has left the office or no
longer remembers the case. Taken altogether, such records also constitute
the raw material needed to generate aggregate reports, as will be discussed
further in Part III(D). Particularly if they include minimal data about the
cases that were declined (e.g. type of case, referring agency, and basic
biographical information about the targets and victims such as race, gender,
and age), such records also can serve significant accountability interests.
Keeping track of these declinations can help prosecutors spot trends that
might cause them to dig further (e.g. if they suggest under-enforcement on
priority issues like sexual assault or police violence, or racial disparities in
the exercise of discretion). 237
What should cause a prosecutor to move from the bottom left quadrant
(private, sparse) to the bottom right quadrant (private, detailed) for a
declination statement? In an ideal world, this would be the default quadrant.
Statements that include a narrative of the prosecutor’s decision-making—
including the facts, law, and normative considerations that informed the
exercise of discretion—will be most useful from the perspective of internal
237

See, e.g., KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra note 6 (analyzing dataset from New York
County District Attorney’s Office for racial and ethnic disparity at multiple discretionary
points, including declinations).
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and external accountability. 238 But even those that lack a narrative can
further such interests, such as the forms that have a prosecutor choose
rationales from a standardized list of reasons, because they also can bring to
light patterns and trends (perhaps even more so than narratives, which may
still require coding to be useful for this purpose). 239 Such records can help
prosecutors evaluate whether they are acting in a consistent manner across
cases and, in any individual case, in a manner that aligns with their
precommitments. 240 More detail also helps prosecutors accurately convey to
affected parties the rationale for the declination (if appropriate), and
reconstruct the rationale for the decision should the prosecutor ever need to
revisit the case (e.g. should new evidence come to light, or in the context of
an oversight hearing).
Because such statements remain private, the risks still are minimal; in
fact, the most significant risk is of depleting prosecutorial resources. Thus,
the constraint on setting private, detailed declination statements as the default
is largely a practical one. That constraint might be addressed in several
possible ways, including reducing the amount of information that prosecutors
are required to record (e.g. by using checklists). Alternatively, prosecutors
might select a few case types for which they will require detailed declination
statements, or relatively more detailed statements. For example, prosecutors
might choose cases involving allegations of public corruption, police
misconduct, or domestic and sexual violence, where there have long been
concerns about underenforcement and preferential treatment, and because
such conduct uniquely threatens democratic ideals of equal protection of the
law and political participation. 241 Or random selection could be utilized.
238

See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (describing how writing one’s reasons
serves a beneficial constraining function).
239
See Miller & Wright, supra note 10 (analyzing precisely such data from the New
Orleans District Attorney’s Office to identify the most common reasons for declinations in a
variety of case types).
240
See, e.g., KATHERINE K. MOY ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, RATE MY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TOWARD A SCORECARD FOR PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 28 (2018) (citing
models of indices developed in other public policy fields and suggesting that similar
“prosecutorial scorecard[s] would enable sitting prosecutors to better understand where their
offices need the most work”); David Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between
Prosecutors and Democracy in the United States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 14.
241
See Darryl Brown, supra note 38 (identifying these three categories of cases as among
those prone to under-enforcement); cf. Roiphe, supra note 156, at 505 (arguing for an
enhanced duty to charge in cases involving “historically neglected and abused” minorities
because such cases “implicate[] basic democratic principles of equality and fairness.”);
Richman, supra note 14, at 55 (suggesting that prosecutors play a particularly important role
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Even if prosecutors only write detailed declination statements in occasional
randomly selected cases, or in certain categories of cases, doing so would
enable spot-checking to ensure consistency with established norms and allow
periodic reevaluation of those norms. 242 Fortunately, there are a growing
number of private sector resources available to help prosecutors take on these
tasks and make the administrative and financial burdens less onerous. 243
Even if prosecutors are able only to record the data, external actors afforded
access can help prosecutors analyze it to produce regular reports.244
B. SOMETIMES MOVE TO PUBLIC, SPARSE

When should a prosecutor move into one of the top two quadrants on
the diagram and issue a public declination statement? In the context of a
statement that identifies a particular individual as having been the subject or
target of investigation (or a victim), this move should remain rare. In any
circumstance in which the individual has not previously been publicly
associated with a criminal investigation, the risk to reputational harm by
issuing a public statement ordinarily would be too great. Even if the person
is herself aware of the investigation, a private statement informing her of the
declination ordinarily should be sufficient for the purposes of closure. So
too, a private statement to victims and law enforcement agencies ought to be
sufficient to further many signaling and accountability interests. Although a
public statement might further additional interests, that marginal benefit
often can be accomplished through other means that do not pose the same
when it comes to cases involving “domestic violence, gang intimidation, or official
corruption” because such abuses of power are easily hidden from outsiders, while the harms
they inflict extend “well beyond the injury suffered from specific acts” and “can cripple the
ability of victims and those around them to flourish as individuals and citizens”).
242
See Simon, supra note 109, at 13–14 (describing the value of peer review of
challenging decisions within organizations, including those chosen from random samples of
cases).
243
A number of organizations are now focused on collecting such data and helping
prosecutors develop and implement systems to do so as well. See, e.g., FAIR AND JUST
PROSECUTION (last visited Mar. 15, 2019), https://fairandjustprosecution.org [https://perma.cc
/T5PT-Y9HL]; INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION IN PROSECUTION (last visited Mar. 15, 2019), http
s://www.prosecution.org/our-mission [https://perma.cc/226B-J6DP]; MEASURES FOR JUSTICE
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019), https://measuresforjustice.org/about/measures/ [https://perma.cc/
QT9L-4CYH]; see also KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra note 6.
244
See Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 190 (noting the role that “civil society” can play
in mining prosecutors’ data and organizing it “in ways that allow lawyers and policy actors to
judge the work of the agency as a while and its individual decisionmakers.”). As David
Sklansky has written, “outsiders [such as] academic researchers [and] public policy think
tanks . . . [often] have more experience” than prosecutors do at “collecting and analyzing data,
and will be more objective in drawing conclusions” from the data. Sklansky, supra note 75, at
32. Thus, he suggests, prosecutors “should invite them in.” Id.
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risk of reputational harm to the target of the investigation, victims, and
witnesses.
But when an investigation has been in the public eye, the calculus is
different. To begin, the target of the investigation may seek a public
statement from the prosecutor in order to begin the process of repairing
reputational harm that has already occurred. The public interest in the matter
also may be such that accountability interests weigh heavily in favor a public
statement acknowledging the declination. There may be a benefit in
signaling to the public and press (and other investigatory bodies) that the time
for other avenues of redress has come, without intruding on a criminal
investigation. When there is no specific law enforcement risk associated with
doing so (such as an ongoing investigation), the balance of interests and risks
then may tilt toward a public declination statement, at least one in the top left
quadrant (public, sparse). Such a statement might indicate that an
investigation which was previously reported has concluded without the filing
of charges.
To minimize concerns about the prosecutor’s ability to reopen the case
if new information is developed, prosecutors could include standard language
about the non-binding nature of the declination, much as prosecutors attach
language to press releases announcing the filing of charges, which indicate
the charges are merely an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. 245 Although such language may be awkward in some
circumstances (e.g. where it is not reasonably foreseeable that further
investigation will ensue), its inclusion in all declination statements may
usefully forestall questions about its significance in any particular case or
impact on future cases.
How much prior publicity is sufficient to warrant a public, sparse
declination statement is hard to determine ex ante. Here, the policy of the
DOJ’s Antitrust Division, discussed supra, is instructive. 246 It provides that
“[i]n general, the more publicity the matter has received the more likely it is
that the Division will issue a statement.”247 If the prosecutor has previously
acknowledged the investigation publicly, that would be a factor weighing in
favor of finding the requisite publicity has been established. 248
245

Such language would minimize the risk of prosecutors finding themselves in a situation
like the one FBI Director Comey faced when new emails were discovered that necessitated
re-opening the Hillary Clinton email investigation. Had the initial declination announcement
contained such a caveat, Director Comey might not have felt the need to send his subsequent
letter to Congress about the new turn of events. See supra note 135.
246
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
247
See id.
248
See id.
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But publicity alone should not be the only factor in determining whether
to issue even a sparse, public declination statement. It is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition. Such a statement also should serve significant signaling
or accountability interests, or both. These interests generally will be
strongest when certain other factors are present, such as (1) the target of an
investigation is a public figure; (2) the case involved allegations of official
misconduct; or (3) questions may be raised about the prosecutor’s conflict of
interest or malfeasance. 249 That is because these cases tend to raise the
greatest concern about preferential treatment (e.g. for public officials, police,
celebrities, donors, or relatives) or a prosecutor’s lack of commitment or
competency in a particular area (e.g. domestic abuse; police use of force
cases). Accountability interests are particularly salient when two or more of
these factors are present (e.g. a public official accused of official misconduct,
such as corruption or excessive use of force). These factors also may counsel
in favor of a public, detailed declination statement, as discussed further
below.
C. RARELY MOVE TO PUBLIC, DETAILED

Assuming the requisite publicity to justify any public statement at all,
when should a prosecutor provide a detailed declination statement? Here,
the risk of reputational harm is greatest, even if the investigation previously
was publicly reported or confirmed. So too, the more detail a prosecutor
provides, the greater the risk of disclosing information detrimental to
ongoing or future law enforcement efforts, and of later being proven wrong
on the facts. When statements openly acknowledge the exercise of discretion
in the truest sense, they also render a prosecutor vulnerable to political attack
and pressure to act more punitively in the future. Accordingly, detailed
statements are warranted only where their value (i.e., the extent to which they
further signaling, accountability, or history-keeping interests) in the context
of the individual case is unusually high. When that threshold is crossed is
difficult to define with precision, but the analysis is not dissimilar to the
framework already familiar to law enforcement agencies in other contexts,
such as responding to Freedom of Information Act requests for information

249

For a thorough discussion of why cases in which police officers are targets invariably
raise concerns about local prosecutors’ conflict of interest, or at least the appearance of such
conflicts, see Levine, supra note 106. Other circumstances in which a prosecutor’s impartiality
might be subject to question include cases where the head prosecutor overruled the
recommendation of career prosecutors, or a defense lawyer involved in the case donated to the
prosecutor’s campaigns.
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in their files. 250 Even then, prosecutors should consider whether that value
can be sufficiently achieved through other means that do not pose the same
risks, such as de-identified case summaries or aggregate reports issued at
some later date.
In widely publicized cases involving public figures, allegations of
official misconduct, or where questions may be raised about the prosecutor’s
conflict of interest or malfeasance, a sparse declination statement may not be
sufficient to serve accountability interests because it will not provide
sufficient context for outsiders to evaluate the prosecutor’s decision. Thus,
for example, when prosecutors decide not to bring charges in police use of
force cases because of insufficient evidence, or because in their judgment
criminal charges are not warranted, they should be willing to so
acknowledge. 251 So too, such circumstances may provide unique “teachable
moments” in which prosecutors can convey important information about the
law and its limits to an audience that is paying attention, thus heightening the
pedagogical value of such statements. 252 History-keeping interests also are
strongest in cases involving public officers engaged in official misconduct
(examples of which might include not only police use of force cases, but
municipal authorities’ failure to maintain a safe water supply). In such cases,
there is value not only in communicating (thoroughly) the prosecutor’s
declination decision, but also the facts uncovered during the investigation.
The more extensive and complex the investigation, the greater the historykeeping interests are likely to be.
If the foregoing factors weigh in favor of a public, detailed declination
statement, then prosecutors also should consider whether there are other
available mechanisms to further the same interests. As discussed further
250

See, e.g., DOJ v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)
(outlining process for determining whether information in law enforcement records may be
withheld from FOIA request under FOIA Exemption 7(C)); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA
GUIDE, 2004 EDITION, EXEMPTION 7(C) (last updated July 23, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-7c [perma.cc/7323-YW4J] (“Under the traditional
Exemption 7(C) analysis, once a privacy interest has been identified and its magnitude has
been assessed, it is balanced against the magnitude of any recognized public interest that
would be served by disclosure”).
251
Taking ownership of such decisions is far preferable to a prosecutor obfuscating the
extent to which he or she has evaluated the merits of a case, as appeared to be the case with
the Ferguson, Missouri on-duty police shooting of Michael Brown. See, e.g., Ben
Trachtenberg, No, You Stand Up: Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Behind Grand Juries,
80 MO. L. REV. 1099 (2015) (criticizing St. Louis County Prosecutor Robert P. McCulloch for
evading accountability for his own decision by submitting the case against police officer
Darren Wilson to the Grand Jury).
252
See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the value of a few politically
salient public statements).
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below, prosecutors may have other tools at their disposal to achieve much of
the same value. Also, other institutions may be capable of taking up some of
this work, especially history-keeping. When, after considering all of the
above, prosecutors decide to proceed with a public, detailed declination
statement, they should avoid statements that suggest blame or wrongdoing
on the part of the target of an investigation, witnesses, or victims. Such
statements pose considerable risk to the reputational interests of the persons
thus characterized, who will not have the opportunity to contest them in a
judicial forum. Moreover, any marginal value of such comments in
promoting the interests served by declination statements is vastly outweighed
by these reputational risks. Thus, when prosecutors provide details to
support their declinations, they should strive for a neutral tone, letting the
facts speak for themselves.253
Resisting calls for more public statements in individual cases or for
more information may be difficult at times, especially for elected
prosecutors. But having a framework to draw upon in deciding when
information will be released can help, especially when prosecutors share that
framework with the public, including the rationale for withholding
information in the vast majority of cases. As Onora O’Neil has observed, it
is “deception rather than secrecy” that promotes distrust. 254 Thus, when a
prosecutor straightforwardly states that she will not say anything more about
a particular declination decision because of longstanding policy against
doing so (and explains the important interests advanced by that policy), she
may frustrate outsiders, but she is not necessarily undermining their trust in
her. That is likely to be particularly so if the prosecutor is able to point to
other sources of information that convey the range of situations in which the
prosecutor has exercised her discretion not to charge and through which the
prosecutor has rendered herself accountable for those decisions as a whole,
as discussed further in the next section. 255

253

Again, the DOJ Antitrust Division Guidelines on closing statements are instructive.
They provide that “[n]o disparaging characterizations of individuals or organizations will be
included in the statement.” See supra note 173.
254
ONORA O’NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST 72 (2002).
255
As Mark Fenster has observed, “[S]ecrecy can be defensible and even justifiable within
a framework for accountable secrecy—secrecy whose existence is made public and regulated
by democratic procedures that allow the [institution] to be held democratically accountable
for the secrets it keeps.” MARK FENSTER, THE TRANSPARENCY FIX: SECRETS, LEAKS, AND
UNCONTROLLABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (2017) (citing Dennis F. Thompson,
Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1999)) (emphasis in original).
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D. CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES

Before committing to a public, detailed declination statement,
prosecutors should consider what other means are available that might serve
the same interests while posing fewer risks. Two of the chief alternatives
(aggregate reports and de-identified case summaries) draw upon internal
resources. The third, the inclusion of other fact-finding institutions, requires
that prosecutors look outward to consider whether there are other institutions
capable of accomplishing similar aims.
1. Data and Reports
Many of the signaling and accountability interests discussed in Part I
could be furthered by prosecutors’ use of internal declination records to
generate data and reports for external audiences. For example, such reports
provide a vehicle for communicating to different political constituencies the
kinds of cases that were declined, at what rates, and why—thus promoting
prosecutors’ own accountability as well as that of legislators and agencies
when they bear some of the responsibility. What is lost in terms of assessing
the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in any one case might be more than
made up by the availability of information about the prosecutors’
declinations overall, which provide important context. 256 In fact, aggregate
data and reports may be superior to individual statements because they offer
a fuller picture of how prosecutors have exercised their discretion across
entire categories of cases, while posing fewer concerns about fairness. 257 To
the extent that prosecutors present not just raw data, but a narrative account
of what the data signifies in terms of their performance, such reporting is
even more useful. As Onora O’Neill has written, “intelligent accountability”
is not about metrics or “a set of stock performance indicators.” 258 Rather,
“[t]hose who are called to account should give an account of what they have
done, and of their successes or failures, to others who have sufficient time
and experience to assess the evidence and report on it.” 259 Moreover, such
reports provide an important opportunity for prosecutors to signal that they

256
See Tazlitz & Henderson, supra note 79, at 225 (noting that “[t]he easiest
accountability mechanisms to justify are those requiring public reporting and periodic review”
of “composite statistics,” such as those already required by law in a variety of contexts, such
as the number of wiretaps conducted each year).
257
See Simon, supra note 109, at 18 (“Public accountability seems most productive and
least dangerous to fairness values when it focuses on general patterns of practice rather than
individual decisions.”).
258
O’NEILL, supra note 254, at 58 (emphasis in original).
259
Id.
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view declinations as a crucial part of their role and to educate the public about
this aspect of the prosecutorial function. 260
2. De-Identified Case Summaries
Prosecutors also could employ de-identified case summaries to
accomplish many of the accountability and pedagogical interests discussed
in Part I. That is, prosecutors could periodically publish information about
cases that include discussion of the relevant facts, law, and other factors that
influenced the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, but redact any identifying
information about the targets, victims, and witnesses. This option would
approximate the value of public, detailed declination statements in many
respects, while avoiding most of their risks. 261 In fact, their pedagogical
value would be greater than identified statements, because they could be
more detailed and more frequently released, thus more completely conveying
critical aspects of the law and prosecutors’ interpretation and application of
it. They also could provide useful context in which to evaluate a prosecutor’s
charging decision in any particular case that comes under scrutiny.
3. Other Fact-Finding Institutions
Finally, prosecutors should consider whether there are other institutions
capable of serving the history-keeping interests that a public, detailed
declination can provide. In most U.S. jurisdictions, grand juries will not be
a candidate for this role. But there are a few where, consistent with their
more comprehensive historical role, 262 grand juries still are authorized to
260
By way of example, although not required to by law, in King County, Washington,
State’s Attorney Dan Satterberg publishes such an annual report on his decisions to try
individuals under the age of eighteen as adults or juveniles, a matter over which prosecutors
have considerable discretion. See DAN SATTERBERG & RONALD WRIGHT, PROSECUTION THAT
EARNS COMMUNITY TRUST 5 (Nov. 2018).
261
For example, in FCPA cases, the Department of Justice has adopted an opinion-letter
procedure whereby companies can request an opinion from DOJ as to whether prospective
conduct would lead to an enforcement action. DOJ publishes these letters on its website
without disclosing the identity of the requesting party or any of the actors involved. See DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASES (last updated June 17, 2015), https://www.justice
.gov/criminal-fraud/opinion-procedure-releases [https://perma.cc/75JR-F5JQ]. Because these
letters refer only to prospective conduct, they differ from the kind of anonymized declination
letter suggested herein, which would describe conduct that a party actually engaged in which
resulted in a declination. But the pedagogical value would be similar.
262
See generally RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1634–1941 (1963) (discussing history of grand juries in the United States,
which included greater direct citizen involvement and independence from prosecutors); Peter
L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct and
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deliver a fact-finding report in certain circumstances, usually those involving
official misconduct. 263 For example, in 1974 a federal grand jury in the
District of Columbia issued a report (now known as the Watergate “road
map”) detailing the evidence of misconduct against President Nixon and his
associates. 264 That report was not released publicly at the time, but (with
court approval) was transmitted to Congress.265 In New York, a state grand
jury issued a 170-page report in the Tawana Brawley scandal of 1987, which
involved allegations of police and prosecutorial misconduct. 266 And in 2019,
a Pennsylvania state grand jury issued a comprehensive report about sex
abuse in the Catholic Church that spanned decades. 267
Grand jury reports are in some ways superior to prosecutorial
declination statements. To begin, they are generally authorized only in cases
deemed by the legislature to be of the greatest public interest, such as those
involving public corruption. 268 They also offer the advantage of providing
some external check on prosecutors’ narrative of events, since such reports,
even if drafted by the prosecutor, must be endorsed by the grand jury.
Moreover, before such reports may become public, review by the district
court may be required to ensure that the report is supported by a
preponderance of the evidence developed in the course of the

Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of Police Brutality When the
Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 299–306 (1994).
263
See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 31–32 (1977) (noting that “[m]any states prohibit grand jury reports”
and where they are permitted, they generally are limited to situations involving “publicly
elected officials” rather than “purely private activity,” and where there is express statutory
authority to issue such a report).
264
See Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Archivists Release Watergate Report That Could Be Possible
“Road Map” for Mueller, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2018), https://nationalpost.com/news/world/
u-s-archivists-release-watergate-report-that-could-be-a-possible-road-map-for-robert-mueller
-on-trump [https://perma.cc/VCW5-XLVD].
265
See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning
Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
266
See STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF DUTCHESS, REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1988), https://archive.org/stream/TawanaBrawleyGrandJuryReport/tawana
_brawley_archive_djvu.txt [https://perma.cc/LH4X-2U97]; see also We, The Grand Jury:
Text of Its Conclusions in the Tawana Brawley Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1988, at B4
(reprinting key findings of the grand jury).
267
See supra note 142.
268
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (authorizing grand jury reports in cases involving
misconduct by public officers or employees or organized crime); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4542
(limiting investigative grand jury reports to cases involving organized, public corruption, or
“proposing recommendations for legislative, executive, or administrative action in the public
interest based upon stated findings”).
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investigation. 269 Thus, the ensuing report may be more accurate than a
statement reviewed only in the prosecutor’s office. Some laws authorizing
grand jury reports also provide built-in mechanisms for the protection of
privacy, such as advance notice to those named in the report and judicial
review, so that those named can petition a court to block the report’s release
or for redactions. 270 Finally, because grand jury reports are issued in the
name of the grand jury, pursuant to express authorization, they do not raise
the same questions about legitimacy and overreach that may be lodged
against prosecutorial declination statements that are public and detailed.
In addition to grand juries, other institutions also may be available to
probe the facts of important events and make public their findings. For
example, Texas and Washington use lay jurors to hear evidence and answer
interrogatories about their findings in a procedure known as an inquest,
which does not involve prosecutors or any determination of guilt or
liability. 271 These are frequently used to investigate deaths involving on-duty
law enforcement officers. 272 And the United States military uses a
mechanism called a Board of Inquiry to determine the facts of significant
events. This procedure is independent of the Court Martial process, the
military’s equivalent to criminal trials.273 Regulatory agencies also may have
the authority and even superior expertise to determine the facts surrounding
high-impact events like public health or infrastructure disasters.
Legislative oversight committees also could provide the requisite
accounting. For example, during the Watergate era, the public learned what
transpired not from the grand jury report, but through the televised hearings
held by a bipartisan congressional committee, which later issued its own
report summarizing the evidence.274 Similarly, in 2019, notwithstanding the
fact that Mueller Report covered much of the same ground, the bipartisan
Senate Select Intelligence Committee issued a two-volume report detailing
269

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3333(b)(1); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4552(b).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3333(c); 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 4552(e). The federal statute also
provides that public grand jury reports may not be “critical of an identified person” who is not
a public officer or employee. 18 U.S.C. § 3333(b)(2).
271
See Steve Miletich, Review Finds Seattle Police Shooting of Che Taylor Fell Within
Department Policy, SEATTLE TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-ne
ws/crime/review-finds-seattle-police-shooting-of-che-taylor-fell-within-department-policy/ [
https://perma.cc/ND69-84RU].
272
Id.
273
DEP’T OF NAVY, PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND BOARDS OF INQUIRY, http://
www.jag.navy.mil/library/instructions/5830_1A.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3LW-NA5G].
274
See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, 93RD CONG.,
FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Comm. Print 1974).
270
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Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 275 Such hearings
and reports have a long history in the United States. 276 Legislatures also can
appointed independent commissions, such as the 9/11 Commission, 277 to
make findings of fact and generate recommendations for reform. 278
In cases that have attracted extraordinary public attention, advocacy
organizations and the press may also be able to fulfill some of this function,
including by obtaining information in the prosecutors’ files pursuant to
Freedom of Information Act requests. Finally, civil enforcement authorities
may be enlisted to help serve this function, some co-located within the same
offices as prosecutors. For example, state Attorneys General and many units
of the DOJ, including United States Attorneys’ Offices, have civil
enforcement authority. In circumstances where prosecutors have decided
that criminal charges are not appropriate, a civil action could further
important history-keeping interests (in addition to providing a measure of
accountability for wrongdoers) by providing a public forum in which to tell
the story about what happened, through the filing of a complaint and eventual
civil trial or settlement process.279
275
See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES
CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION, VOL. I AND II, https://www.intell
igence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z6Y
-S269], https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5TD3-RFV7].
276
See INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT, supra note 54.
277
See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT (2004).
278
For example, Australia, Ireland, and Great Britain have all established Commissions
to investigate child sex abuse in the Church, with different mandates and powers. See, e.g.,
Melissa Davey, Catholic Church Dismisses Key Recommendations from Landmark Inquiry
into Child Abuse, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2
017/dec/15/royal-commission-final-report-australia-child-abuse [https://perma.cc/8KWC-K
U5T] (reviewing all three commissions and noting that the Australian Commission has been
consistently praised by experts and survivors). The Commission model also has been relied
upon in the context of wrongful convictions to investigate their causes and make
recommendations for reform. See, e.g., Jessica A. Roth, The Institutions of Innocence Review:
A Comparative Sociological Perspective, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1143 (2018) (discussing
establishment of such commissions in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States in
reaction to high-profile exonerations).
279
See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, From Anonymity to Scourge of Wall Street,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/from-anonymity-toscourge-of-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/6TF6-BEJA] (describing Department of Justice’s
use of previously ignored federal civil statute to secure large settlements from banks engaged
in mortgage fraud that led to the financial crisis); Michael J. de la Merced, In JP Morgan Case,
the Martin Act Rides Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
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When no other institution is available to engage in fact-finding or will
not be able to do so quickly enough to satisfy a pressing public need for
information, the rationale for prosecutors to issue a public, detailed
declination statement is at its highest. But such circumstances ought to arise
rarely. Moreover, thinking about them as a category ex ante should prompt
prosecutors, policy makers, and legislatures to consider whether we want
prosecutors to serve as history-keepers, or whether, alternatively, we should
invest in creating and supporting a diversity of institutions capable of
performing that task outside of the criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
As important as prosecutors’ decisions to bring criminal charges are
prosecutors’ decisions not to charge. But historically prosecutors have not
talked much about this critical part of their role. Prosecutors’ failure to
communicate about their exercise of negative discretion is unfortunate, as it
leaves the public with an incomplete understanding of the prosecutorial
function and other important information, including the content of the law
and prosecutors’ priorities. It also undermines the ability of the public and
other institutions to hold prosecutors accountable for their exercise of
discretion, and to hold accountable the other institutional actors who share
with prosecutors the authority and responsibility for criminal law
enforcement. Although generally there are good reasons not to discuss
individual cases in which a prosecutor has declined to charge, those reasons
do not support a blanket refusal by prosecutors to discuss declinations at all.
To the contrary, there is much to be gained from talking about declinations,
which this Article has described as signaling, accountability, and historykeeping interests. But because there are significant risks attached,
particularly privacy and reputational risks, in the context of individual cases,
statements about declinations must be made with forethought rather than on
an ad hoc basis or defensively.
This Article offers a framework to help prosecutors do just that. It
encourages prosecutors to consider the interests that would be served by
issuing a declination statement in a particular manner, the risks that would be
posed thereby, and whether alternatives are available that would serve those
interests at lesser risk. It enlarges the frame of declination statements to
include not only the occasional public statement in a high-profile case, but
also other kinds of statements about declinations, such as aggregate reports
2012/10/02/in-jpmorgan-case-the-martin-act-rides-again/
[https://perma.cc/3P2M-7MFB]
(describing aggressive use by New York Attorneys General of the Martin Act, a state statute
providing criminal and civil remedies, to address a wide variety of corporate misconduct).
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and de-identified case summaries, that can convey much of the same
information and accomplish many of the same objectives, only better. Such
practices not only serve important interests in signaling and accountability,
but they also provide necessary context in the rare circumstance in which a
prosecutor decides to issue a detailed, public statement in an individual case.
Finally, the framework invites prosecutors to consider what other institutions
are available to engage in fact-finding and the reconstruction of past events
when the need for such a narrative is pressing. Assisted by this framework,
prosecutors can intentionally and effectively communicate about
declinations.

